Robert,
Unfortunately, resetting the crypto on a COMRESET can cause many other
problems. Other things can cause a COMRESET to occur on the SATA bus
besides a warm boot. Some COMRESETs are "commanded", i.e. the OS might
explicitly request a COMRESET to be sent to the device if a pending
command is taking too long to complete. Other COMRESETs are
"non-commanded", and might occur as a result of temporary loss of
synchronization between the host and the device (e.g. due to a flaky SATA
cable) or possibly when exiting a SATA low-power state such as Partial or
Slumber. Some chipsets are notorious for sending many non-commanded
COMRESETs.
If the device resets its crypto (i.e. forgets the key) every time a
COMRESET is received, you could be headed for many system crashes.
Best regards,
Darren Lasko
Principal Engineer
Advanced Development Group, Storage Products
Fujitsu Computer Products of America
"Robert Wann" <rw...@enovatech.com>
Sent by: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com
07/16/2009 11:13 AM
Please respond to
Robert Wann <rw...@enovatech.com>; Please respond to
fde@www.xml-dev.com
To
<fde@www.xml-dev.com>
cc
Subject
Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
There exists an effective solution to mitigate the OS attacks (warm boot
as being described by Garrett) using all disk drives including SED and
FDE. This can be done without a TPM or any other extra components as
suggested by Dmitry & Darren.
Garrett said:
<Thanks for the info, Lark.
So the attack vector is reduced to:
1. the machine is on* (like if the user locks his screen & walks away for
a moment), and then
2. someone steals the laptop (leaving it on), and then
3. restarts the machine using a boot disc or bootable USB stick.>
A warm boot such as Ctl-Alt-Del causes SATA host to issue COMRESET which
in turn resets device protocol stacks without power being interrupted.
What SED and FDE would need to perform is to reset the crypto engine upon
COMRESET to invalidate the AES secret key of either the disk controller
(if the crypto engine is embedded within the disk controller) or the
separate crypto controller working in conjunction with the disk
controller. The solution is indifferent to the boot sequence.
The X-Wall MX (http://www.enovatech.net/products/mx_info.htm) does just
that.
Thanks,
Robert Wann
CTO
Enova Technology Corp.
www.enovatech.com; i...@enovatech.com;
----- Original Message -----
From: Garrett M. Groff
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2009 5:54 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I'm definitely not suggesting that hardware-based FDE should also handle
OS attacks, attacks on RAM, etc. That would certainly fall out of scope
with the purpose of the drive. The only remaining concern I have is that
hardware FDE doesn't require re-authentication on reboot. Again,
hibernation or shutdown defeat this attack scenario, but security is about
risk assessment, so that is what I'm trying to gauge here (the relative
risks associated with hardware FDE vs software FDE).
------------------
Changing gears slightly...
Can anyone describe the anti-hammering that is built into the Seagate FDE
drive (to preclude brute-forcing the authentication passphrase)?
G
----- Original Message -----
From: Dmitry Obukhov
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2009 3:52 PM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Hi Garrett,
The described attack is not in the SED threat model. As Lark said, we are
focusing on data-at-rest. Basically, you described hi-jack attack, when
powered-on computer is stolen. You will need one more element in the
system, proximity sensor, to mitigate this attack. There are plenty of
sensors on the market:
For example:
http://www.officedepot.com/a/products/823445/Tripp-Lite-Wireless-USB-Proximity-Lock/?cm_mmc=Mercent-_-Google-_-Security_Tools_and_Cleaning-_-823445&mr:trackingCode=0DD648A0-CD65-DE11-B7F3-0019B9C043EB&mr:referralID=NA
If you have built-in Bluetooth, you can use software solution like this
one: http://www.bluetoothpassport.com/
or even freeware open source:
http://members.lycos.co.uk/wuul/bluelock/readme.html
You may need to change sensor software configuration to hibernate instead
of sleep or starting screensaver. In combination with hardware disk
encryption it will give you good protection against hijack and even
against followed cold boot attack on hi-jacked machine.
Dmitry
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:30 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Thanks for the info, Lark.
So the attack vector is reduced to:
1. the machine is on* (like if the user locks his screen & walks away for
a moment), and then
2. someone steals the laptop (leaving it on), and then
3. restarts the machine using a boot disc or bootable USB stick.
Begging the question: Are there ways of mitigating that avenue of attack
beyond just changing the boot sequence in the BIOS & password-protecting
the BIOS setup?
* I understand many other vulnerabilities exist on running operating
systems, such as buffer overflow attacks on system services via the
network, but I find that avenue of attack less likely than simply using a
boot disc (as described above), esp as self-encrypting drives become more
widespread.
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the
Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive,
either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation,
the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is
encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is
locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to
have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the
drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide
the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user.
Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from
hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot
scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and
security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use
hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell
systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for
secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes
are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate
Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is
that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold
machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then
that presents the following vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes
machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the
HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system &
reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus
FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically
suffer the same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the
Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive,
either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation,
the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is
encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is
locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to
have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the
drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide
the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user.
Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from
hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot
scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and
security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use
hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell
systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for
secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes
are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate
Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is
that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold
machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then
that presents the following vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes
machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the
HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system &
reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus
FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically
suffer the same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the
Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive,
either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation,
the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is
encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is
locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to
have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the
drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide
the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user.
Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from
hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot
scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and
security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use
hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell
systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for
secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes
are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate
Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is
that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold
machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then
that presents the following vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes
machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the
HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system &
reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus
FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically
suffer the same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
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