I'm definitely not suggesting that hardware-based FDE should also handle OS
attacks, attacks on RAM, etc. That would certainly fall out of scope with the
purpose of the drive. The only remaining concern I have is that hardware FDE
doesn't require re-authentication on reboot. Again, hibernation or shutdown
defeat this attack scenario, but security is about risk assessment, so that is
what I'm trying to gauge here (the relative risks associated with hardware FDE
vs software FDE).
------------------
Changing gears slightly...
Can anyone describe the anti-hammering that is built into the Seagate FDE drive
(to preclude brute-forcing the authentication passphrase)?
G
----- Original Message -----
From: Dmitry Obukhov
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2009 3:52 PM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Hi Garrett,
The described attack is not in the SED threat model. As Lark said, we are
focusing on data-at-rest. Basically, you described hi-jack attack, when
powered-on computer is stolen. You will need one more element in the system,
proximity sensor, to mitigate this attack. There are plenty of sensors on the
market:
For example:
http://www.officedepot.com/a/products/823445/Tripp-Lite-Wireless-USB-Proximity-Lock/?cm_mmc=Mercent-_-Google-_-Security_Tools_and_Cleaning-_-823445&mr:trackingCode=0DD648A0-CD65-DE11-B7F3-0019B9C043EB&mr:referralID=NA
If you have built-in Bluetooth, you can use software solution like this one:
http://www.bluetoothpassport.com/
or even freeware open source:
http://members.lycos.co.uk/wuul/bluelock/readme.html
You may need to change sensor software configuration to hibernate instead of
sleep or starting screensaver. In combination with hardware disk encryption it
will give you good protection against hijack and even against followed cold
boot attack on hi-jacked machine.
Dmitry
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:30 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Thanks for the info, Lark.
So the attack vector is reduced to:
1. the machine is on* (like if the user locks his screen & walks away for a
moment), and then
2. someone steals the laptop (leaving it on), and then
3. restarts the machine using a boot disc or bootable USB stick.
Begging the question: Are there ways of mitigating that avenue of attack beyond
just changing the boot sequence in the BIOS & password-protecting the BIOS
setup?
* I understand many other vulnerabilities exist on running operating systems,
such as buffer overflow attacks on system services via the network, but I find
that avenue of attack less likely than simply using a boot disc (as described
above), esp as self-encrypting drives become more widespread.
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the Seagate
Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive, either at full
system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation, the drive locks and
all user data, including the hibernation file is encrypted and unavailable.
When the system is powered up the FDE drive is locked. If an alternate system
is booted, the drive will only appear to have a 128MB available, which is the
protected read-only partition on the drive which stores the shadow master boot
record which is used to provide the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the
drive by an authorized user. Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot
process or return from hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for
alternate boot scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked
state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and security
settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use hibernate mode, even
if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell systems, Seagate, Wave, and
Dell worked together to create a solution for secure standby mode, so for Dell
systems both hibernate and standby modes are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate Momentus
FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is that the user is
only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold machine (one that has
been shut down completely). If that's correct, then that presents the following
vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes machine
& then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the HDD. Since
HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system & reads (or writes!)
data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus FDE
drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically suffer the
same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the Seagate
Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive, either at full
system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation, the drive locks and
all user data, including the hibernation file is encrypted and unavailable.
When the system is powered up the FDE drive is locked. If an alternate system
is booted, the drive will only appear to have a 128MB available, which is the
protected read-only partition on the drive which stores the shadow master boot
record which is used to provide the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the
drive by an authorized user. Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot
process or return from hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for
alternate boot scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked
state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and security
settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use hibernate mode, even
if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell systems, Seagate, Wave, and
Dell worked together to create a solution for secure standby mode, so for Dell
systems both hibernate and standby modes are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate Momentus
FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is that the user is
only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold machine (one that has
been shut down completely). If that's correct, then that presents the following
vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes machine
& then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the HDD. Since
HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system & reads (or writes!)
data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus FDE
drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically suffer the
same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the Seagate
Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive, either at full
system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation, the drive locks and
all user data, including the hibernation file is encrypted and unavailable.
When the system is powered up the FDE drive is locked. If an alternate system
is booted, the drive will only appear to have a 128MB available, which is the
protected read-only partition on the drive which stores the shadow master boot
record which is used to provide the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the
drive by an authorized user. Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot
process or return from hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for
alternate boot scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked
state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and security
settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use hibernate mode, even
if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell systems, Seagate, Wave, and
Dell worked together to create a solution for secure standby mode, so for Dell
systems both hibernate and standby modes are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com [mailto:fde-boun...@www.xml-dev.com] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: fde@www.xml-dev.com
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate Momentus
FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is that the user is
only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold machine (one that has
been shut down completely). If that's correct, then that presents the following
vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes machine
& then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the HDD. Since
HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system & reads (or writes!)
data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus FDE
drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically suffer the
same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
FDE@www.xml-dev.com
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde