Re: Supervenience

On 29 May 2017 6:36 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 5/28/2017 11:13 AM, David Nyman wrote: I recently posted a comment in reply to Russell on the topic of supervenience, but it may have got lost in the recent posting confusion. Anyway, I append it again

Supervenience

I recently posted a comment in reply to Russell on the topic of supervenience, but it may have got lost in the recent posting confusion. Anyway, I append it again below, slightly amended for comprehension in isolation. The comments bear on physical supervenience and on whether consciousness could

Fwd: Re: Question about physical supervenience

Not sure if you saw this. -- Forwarded message -- From: "David Nyman" <da...@davidnyman.com> Date: 18 May 2017 6:34 p.m. Subject: Re: Question about physical supervenience To: "everything-list" <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Cc: On 18 May 20

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 6:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​ >> ​A model could be accurate ​or inaccurate.​ > > > ​>​ > This makes no sense with the technical sense of model by the logician. > If logicians can make no sense out ​of​ the words ​ ​" accurate ​"​ or ​"​

Re: Question about physical supervenience

. In > >these counter examples, B covaries with A such that A+B does not > >change when C changes. > > I don't succeed in imagining a simple example, still less a rock or > the UD*, where a change in "B" is capable of changing the > supervenience on "A", ot

Re: Question about physical supervenience

;in C will necessitate a change in A + B. > > > >You are making an unwarranted assumption that A and B are > >independent. Just because A changes, does not entail that A+B > >changes. In > >these counter examples, B covaries with A such that A+B does not > >c

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 5/18/2017 2:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 May 2017, at 20:42, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/17/2017 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Exactly. I might try to add some possible mathematical precision, but I need to think a bit on this. Later. Up to now, the B of Bp & p is interpreted by

Re: Question about physical supervenience

wrote: >> >>> The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these >>> transformations, in the computationalist framework,​ *as computation per >>> se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenience relation with >>> consciousnes

Re: Question about physical supervenience

tion per >> se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenience relation with >> consciousness. This then introduces an ambiguity into the notion of such >> supervenience which is eliminated when the extraneous attachment to >> physical action is discarded. In short, physic

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On 18 May 2017, at 01:15, John Clark wrote: On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 5:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​A model is the math version of a reality. ​A model could be accurate ​or inaccurate.​ This makes no sense with the technical sense of model by the logician.

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 17 May 2017, at 23:16, David Nyman wrote: On 17 May 2017 at 19:49, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote: As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 17 May 2017, at 20:49, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote: As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to command an entire domain of such personally "unprovable" facts

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 17 May 2017, at 20:42, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/17/2017 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Exactly. I might try to add some possible mathematical precision, but I need to think a bit on this. Later. Up to now, the B of Bp & p is interpreted by its computational rendering, but "B" is really

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 5:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > ​> ​ > A model is the math version of a reality. > ​A model could be accurate ​ or inaccurate.​ > ​> ​ > A theory > ​A theory c ould also be accurate ​ or inaccurate.​ ​> ​ is a finite object ​A theory is a

Re: Question about physical supervenience

yes. I think there's a subtlety here. If we're speaking about *physical* supervenience (which is after all the only kind that could be "observed" externally) then of course I agree with you and Brent that the relation with computation and hence, by assumption, with consciousness, beco

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 17 May 2017 at 19:49, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > > As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are > observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to command > an entire domain of such

Re: Question about physical supervenience

*physical* supervenience (which is after all the only kind that could be "observed" externally) then of course I agree with you and Brent that the relation with computation and hence, by assumption, with consciousness, becomes ambiguous in the sense that it's open to variation by

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 5/17/2017 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote: As a (very) rough and partial analogy, if I am on deck, and you are observing me from aloft, I can grasp that you are in a position to command an entire domain of such personally "unprovable" facts about me, despite my not being in a position​ to

Re: Question about physical supervenience

tion per >> se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenience relation with >> consciousness. This then introduces an ambiguity into the notion of such >> supervenience which is eliminated when the extraneous attachment to >> physical action is discarded. In short, physic

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 5/17/2017 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Exactly. I might try to add some possible mathematical precision, but I need to think a bit on this. Later. Up to now, the B of Bp & p is interpreted by its computational rendering, but "B" is really provability, and not computation. Up to here,

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 5/17/2017 2:35 AM, David Nyman wrote: The problem comes only if you attempt to "reverse interpret" these transformations, in the computationalist framework,​ *as computation per se* and hence, by assumption, as having a supervenience relation with consciousness. This then

Re: Question about physical supervenience

t;> >>>>> On 16 May 2017, at 17:34, David Nyman wrote: >>>>> > > >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>>>>>>

Re: Question about physical supervenience

34, David Nyman wrote: On 16 May 2017 at 08:07, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote: On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking a bit about phys

Re: Question about physical supervenience

Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote: >> >> I've been thi

Re: Question about physical supervenience

n wrote: On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't really understand it. So let'

Re: Question about physical supervenience

covaries with A such that A+B does not change when C changes. I don't succeed in imagining a simple example, still less a rock or the UD*, where a change in "B" is capable of changing the supervenience on "A", other than a change in the first person indeterminacy

Re: Question about physical supervenience

5 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote: >> >> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the >> computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't >> really u

Re: Question about physical supervenience

C supervenes on >> A, it means only that a change in C necessitates a change in A. So >> if C supervenes on A, it has to supervene on A + B, because a change >> in C will necessitate a change in A + B. >> > > You are making an unwarranted assumption that A and B a

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On 16 May 2017, at 23:32, John Clark wrote: On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​​​T​here is no mathematical reason time or space or anything else can't be continuous​,​ nor can mathematics find anything special about the​ numbers 1.6*10^-35​

Re: Question about physical supervenience

r program by a suitable time-based transformation applied by an external observer, then yes. I think there's a subtlety here. If we're speaking about *physical* supervenience (which is after all the only kind that could be "observed" externally) then of course I agree with you an

Re: Question about physical supervenience

een thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accepting the replacement of all or part of my brain with a digital prosthesis. Now, whatever theory th

Re: Question about physical supervenience

ess a rock or the UD*, where a change in "B" is capable of changing the supervenience on "A", other than a change in the first person indeterminacy (but this is taking into account by the abandon of the physical supervenience: we know already that the first person experienc

Re: Question about physical supervenience

e consciousness is no longer supervenient on the original program, but on the transformation. I can't help feeling this is telling me something is awry with the definition of supervenience, rather than of computationalism or materialism. -- ---

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 5/15/2017 7:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I think your analysis above needs to be extended to cover that. You seem to take

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​>> ​ >> ​ >> ​T​ >> here is no mathematical reason time or space or anything else can't be >> continuous >> ​,​ >> nor can mathematics find anything special about the >> ​ >> numbers 1.6*10^-35 >> ​ >> or >> ​ >>

Re: Question about physical supervenience

so supported without > change in the state of the rock. Yes, it is not an argument for rocks thinking, it is an argument against physical supervenience. Some are offended by this and prefer to throw out computationalism altogether. I make exactly this argument in my as yet unpublished paper &quo

Re: Question about physical supervenience

>> >> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the >> computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't >> really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accepting the >> replacement of all or part of my brain with a digital p

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:47:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote: > > >On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> > >>We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't > >>the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 16 May 2017, at 04:44, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I think your analysis above needs to be extended to cover that. You seem to take

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 15 May 2017, at 22:44, David Nyman wrote: On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On 16 May 2017, at 04:17, John Clark wrote: On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 7:06 PM, David Nyman wrote: ​>> ​Physics prevents the above paradoxes because all of these thought experiments assume that space or time or both are infinitely divisible, but quantum physics says

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 11:41:04AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > > We had extended arguments starting from "Why isn't > the-rock-that-computes everything conscious?" I think your analysis > above needs to be extended to cover that. You seem to take > "perception" as a given attribute of the

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 7:06 PM, David Nyman wrote: ​>> ​Physics prevents the above paradoxes because all of these >> thought experiments assume that space or time or both are infinitely >> divisible, but quantum physics says there is a smallest length (1.6*10^-35 >>

Re: Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On 15 May 2017 at 21:35, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 6:38 AM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > > ​> ​ >> I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the >> computationalist context and have

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 15 May 2017 at 19:41, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 5/15/2017 3:38 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the > computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't > really understa

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 15 May 2017 at 15:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote: > > I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the > computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't > really understand

Paradox and supervenience (was Question about physical supervenience)

On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 6:38 AM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: ​> ​ > I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the > computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't > really understand it. > If X superveniens Y then there can

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 5/15/2017 3:38 AM, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accepting the replacement of all or part of my brain

Re: Question about physical supervenience

On 15 May 2017, at 12:38, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accepting the replacement of all or part of my brain

Question about physical supervenience

I've been thinking a bit about physical supervenience in the computationalist context and have come to the conclusion that I don't really understand it. So let's consider CT + YD. YD means accepting the replacement of all or part of my brain with a digital prosthesis. Now, whatever theory

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote: I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. What would that mean precisely? It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one David Deutsch, but I am not sure the david deutsch can be OK with this,

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 1 November 2014 04:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote: I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. What would that mean precisely? It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one David

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:35, meekerdb wrote: On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:46, meekerdb wrote: On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world. The universe splits

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with,

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:26, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 30 October 2014 05:50, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another universe. If after that the photons There's only one

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/29/2014 6:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 10:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: ?? What kind of evidence do you refer to. A interference pattern. That's hardly evidence the photon went thru one slit only. Of course not it's would be the exact opposite, it's evidence the photon went through

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic universe surely? But

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in this world the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world' and perhaps every possibility in between. So in the 3p view, all choices balance out. Bruno

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 03:10, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:00, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:01, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 10:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. Then if I compress you in a small box-prison, you have no more choice, but I am afraid you might be conscious. It is like the cul-de-sac worlds, in the Kripke semantics, where

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. Did you make that choice for a reason? If you did it was deterministic if you didn't it was random. If you did it was reasonable if you didn't it was unreasonable.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's *involved* in consciousness. But yes, using that

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or whatever). But to say the

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds,

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 25 October 2014 05:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: the only one giving ambiguity is you In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is giving ambiguity; in such a world

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic,

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 27 October 2014 07:33, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Just go reread the thread Re: For John Clark october 2013... or read the last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit about

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? This point was originally about

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 26 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, That is not relevant for the point you made.

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 27 Oct 2014, at 12:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:10 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 28 Oct 2014, at 1:10 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 Oct 2014, at 19:13, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett QM, Like I

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On 24 Oct 2014, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city will you be in?, all that can

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 11:39 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get a arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real

Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience

On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, That is not relevant for the point you made. Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about

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