The semantics of subjectAltName depend on use. For example
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4945
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 1:57 AM, Thomas alth...@gmx.net wrote:
Hey there,
for openssl, is it necessary to include the CN in the subjectAltName field
if the latter one is present at all ?
I would
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 9:24 AM, lists li...@rustichelli.net wrote:
By its nature, a hash completely changes if just a bit of the original
content is modified
By design, a cryptographic hash function (on average) changes half the
output bits when a single bit in the input is inverted.
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 3:27 PM, redpath redp...@us.ibm.com wrote:
When using this command
openssl genrsa -out test.pem 2048
an RSA pair is created. Its not so much I want to know how a pair is
randomly selected
but how secure is that random selection. Random number generators are a
On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 8:06 PM, Michael Sierchio ku...@tenebras.com wrote:
- Select an interval near the desired size
[ 2^1023 + 1^1022 + 1 , 2^1024 - 1 ]
- Sieve out composites divisible by small primes
- Select two probable primes such that (p - q) is reasonably large
(2^100 or so
RC4 is not patented - RC4 is a Trademark of RSA Security.
On Wed, Jan 23, 2013 at 8:36 AM, sarju tambe sarjuta...@gmail.com wrote:
In OpenSSL(README File, openssl version-0.98x), there are 4 patented
algorithms RC5, RC4, IDEA, Camellia out of which RC5 and Camellia are
disabled in Configure
On Mon, Mar 4, 2013 at 9:33 PM, Steven Funasaki
thegreatste...@gmail.com wrote:
Does the CSR need to be signed with the matching private key for the CA to
validate it?
Of course. That demonstrates proof of possession of the private key.
Otherwise there is no binding of an entity to a keypair,
On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 8:26 AM, Viktor Dukhovni openssl-us...@dukhovni.org
wrote:
OpenSSL cipherlists are not for novices.
Like everything else about an old API that grew organically, it has too
much surface area. It's unreasonable to rely on expert performance to
prevent errors - it should
On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 1:34 PM, Dave Thompson dthomp...@prinpay.com wrote:
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org On Behalf Of Bob Bell (rtbell)
Sent: Wednesday, 19 June, 2013 15:01
I have a situation where I need to determine the validity of a certificate
in all other aspects even though it has
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 10:40 PM, Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.comwrote:
If only we could agree to use DJB's Curve25519...
+1
On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 2:09 PM, David Lawless
david_lawl...@flumedata.com wrote:
...
Next I did this:
cd /dev
mv urandom urandom.hold
mknod urandom c 1 8
Which causes /dev/urandom to make use of
the /dev/random driver in the kernel.
The above sort-of works. Some of the new
On Sun, Sep 22, 2013 at 10:00 AM, starlight.201...@binnacle.cx wrote:
Not interested in any PRNG.
/dev/random is a PRNG. As I pointed out, True RBGs don't produce
enough material. The problem is the fact that /dev/random blocks.
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 12:59 PM, starlight.201...@binnacle.cx wrote:
At 20:27 9/23/2013 +0200, Richard Könning wrote:
/dev/random is a PRNG which blocks when the (crude)
entropy estimation of the entropy pool falls below a
limit. Besides this there are afaik no big
differences between
Patrick Patterson wrote:
Actually, what you care about are the keys associated with the certificate.
For encryption, you've got content that is encrypted with the public key, and
decryptable only with the private key. Since the certificate is your public
key signed by some Certificate
David Schwartz wrote:
Arguably, you shouldn't do it even once, because it's extremely easy
to fall into the pattern of one key and one key only in the systems
design or implementation. I can't remember who coined the phrase, but
it's not good crypto hygeine.
I have argued many times that not
Main, James J Civ USAF AMC DET 3 AMCAOS/DOHJ wrote:
Is there a driver available for MAC using ActivClient CAC 6.1? If so
where is it available.
Hey, Jim -
does ActivClient present itself as a cryptosystem service, a la
PKCS#11 or Microsoft's Smart Card interface?
Regards.
- Michael
David Schwartz wrote:
Arguably, you shouldn't do it even once, because it's extremely easy
to fall into the pattern of one key and one key only in the systems
design or implementation. I can't remember who coined the phrase, but
it's not good crypto hygeine.
I have argued many times that not
David Schwartz wrote:
If you can't trust the system that generates and stores your private key,
you're screwed anyway. So I don't see that this argument has any validity.
A timestamp is not an attribute of a private key. It's utterly
irrelevant. If your purpose is to require that new
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
On Sun, Mar 16, 2008 at 10:44 PM, David Schwartz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you can't trust the system that generates and stores your private key,
you're screwed anyway. So I don't see that this argument has any validity.
The issue is 'who is trusting what?'
David's
David Schwartz wrote:
You have to have absolute trust in any entity that will generate or store your
private key. Thus you can trust any information in it -- anyone who could put
in bogus information could give away your key to strangers. (By absolute trust,
I mean with respect to anything
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
A key's lifetime is, cryptographically speaking, the amount of time
for which it can be expected to provide a sane level of security in
relation to the value of the data which it protects.
Right, which is a matter of consensus best practice, we hope...
Of course,
David Schwartz wrote:
... An attacker can start trying to break your key as soon he has your public
key.
Issuance date of the cert suffices. It's still not an attribute of
the private key.
In any case, you may of course need to validate an old signature, and the
mechanics for that have been
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
On Sun, Mar 16, 2008 at
Since it's infeasable to store all of the possible keypairs in the
number of atoms in the universe, your assertion holds no water.
Did you do the calculation? The number of primes less than or equal
to 512 bits in length number around 10**150,
navneet Upadhyay wrote:
me too
Cancel Your Own Goddam Subscription
- Wm. F Buckley
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User Support Mailing List
David Schwartz wrote:
What I think Michael Sierchio was saying, though, was something different.
He's not saying to treat a certificate as revoked, he's saying not to issue
a certificate. Basically, he's saying a CA could refuse to issue a
certificate for any key that it had ever seen before
David Schwartz wrote:
Michael Sierchio:
If it's your policy not to reuse keys, or allow their use beyond
the lifespan of the certificate, then the enforcement mechanism
for this MUST be in the CA.
I completely disagree. If this were true, CA's would generate the private key
as part
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
Certificate issuance is a statement of identity binding for a given
key at a given assurance. No more, no less.
No, it isn't. It's often more.
A CA does not and cannot specify the value of the data which can be
encrypted or protected by any given key.
Irrelevant
Steffen DETTMER wrote:
For operational, administrative and forensic concerns I think it
is important to know the key generation time as well as who
generated it in exactly which way, who gave the key to whom when
and why and so on - maybe even including a transactional log of
every key usage
Julian wrote:
My fear is that get a hold of P will allow for someone else to use it to
start a protocol disassembly. For instance anyone could create a
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA TLS server and use P to listen for connections, of
course if would have to have a cert signed by CA to proceed even if they
David Schwartz wrote:
... Suppose I include a randomish
string in my message 46e8bd8ceae57f8b7af66536e7859bad. Any attacker might
see this message -- it's public. So he can certainly try that string as your
password. So will you now run off and add it to a blacklist, since it's
clearly now a
David Schwartz wrote:
Every known key, provided there are not too many known keys, is weak.
Once again, you have a very idiosyncratic lexicon of cryptographic
terms. How about if we use these words the way cryptographers do?
A weak key is one that causes a cipher to leak private data in the
Brant Thomsen wrote:
The C++ compiler in Microsoft's Visual Studio 2005 (and later) makes time_t
a 64-bit number when compiling 32-bit code. Older compilers, such as Visual
C++ 6.0, make time_t a 32-bit number, which would cause year 2038 issues.
I'd very much like to see TAI64 adopted where
Glenn wrote:
Lack of entropy? Try using /dev/urandom
/dev/urandom supplies (statistically useful) random bits -- no
claims are made about entropy.
- M
__
OpenSSL Project
RC4 is owned (and trademarked) by RSA Security Inc, but they are no
longer enforcing the patent,
RC4 was never protected by patent, but by trade secret. When the
details of the algorithm were published, Ron Rivest himself suggested
calling the alleged RC4 ARCFOUR. It is indeed a trademark
albertlb wrote:
I am using a debian pc with openssl and openvpn. The problem is I have
revoked a user certificate but the user still has access to the vpn. In the
crl.pem file appears the reference to this user. What could It happen?
Thank you http://www.nabble.com/file/p18487517/openssl.cnf
Samuel Lavitt wrote:
I am wondering how I could determine, with only access to the compiled
binary, if this version has any missing security fixes
The worst vulnerabilities (and your time might be valuable, so prioritization
might be important) have published exploits available.
Black hat
Von Neumann counseled Shannon to call it entropy because no one
really knows what entropy is. ;-)
I wanted to say that it's inherently problematic to use things like the
randomness in the interarrival time of events like interrupts, etc.
to gather entropy -- Ted has touched on this with his
Michael Sierchio wrote:
A bit stream may have 1 bit of entropy per bit of message (i.e. an
entropy of 1), and therefore be incompressible -- perhaps what Schwartz
thinks he means when he says truly random -- and be entirely predictable.
In case this isn't obvious, apply Von Neumann's
Silviu VLASCEANU wrote:
Hello,
I am developing an application which also has some CA functions. The
application knows the public key, KpC, of a client which has a priori
proven to this app the possession of KpC through an out-of-band mean.
Therefore, when the application calls the CA
Kenneth Goldman wrote:
What padding are you specifying? I suspect that you are specifying
no padding, in which case the size of the input must be the same
as the size of the key.
No. The input is the same size as the *modulus*.
When used in encryption the recommended approach for RSA is to
Peter Walker wrote:
The purpose of my application is to send a credit card number in
encrypted format.
Then use OAEP.
- M
__
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User Support Mailing List
Gerd Schering wrote:
So , if I get it right: we have a true random source to seed the PRNG
and this produces true random numbers?
No. There is no such guarantee using any PRNG. PRNGs provide a much higher
bitrate than hardware RNGs or system sources of entropy. They use cryptographic
hash
Edward Diener wrote:
Well I asked whether protection for the client side certs were needed,
and how this might be done, and I was told I was barking up the wrong
tree, so to speak. I felt this way from the very beginning but my
employer wanted to get other opinions.
You are either unclear on
in octets. And more,
sometimes. ;-)
--
Michael Sierchio +1 510 962 5595
PO Box 9036ku...@tenebras.com
Berkeley CA 94709 http://xijiaoshan.blogspot.com
here?
Luckily, yes. The latter version has an extra char.
man echo.
try `echo -n ronald | openssl dgst -sha1 -hmac $apikey`
which doesn't add the '\n' that your version does.
--
Michael Sierchio +1 415 378 1182
PO Box 9036ku
Michael S. Zick wrote:
On Sat May 2 2009, Miguel Ghobangieno wrote:
Furthermore I am aware that you opensource coders are all a buch of
mysoginist sexists;
for the most part you are all _men_. The EEOC is going to hear of THAT
aswell.
Lucas Mocellin wrote:
I would like to generate a certificate valid in hours, does someone know
how to do it? is that possible or I have to manage this hours by myself?
Why? What kind of cert? What is the intended use for the cert? If it's for
the purposes of restricting access to a given
Lucas Mocellin wrote:
I'm sorry, I don't understand very much about, but let's try.
Bad idea. Certs bind identity to public keys. Authentication
is not authorization, and it is extremely important that you
understand the semantics before proceeding, IMHO.
toby.wa...@fxhome.com wrote:
Hello,
I am using the dgst command to sign a file, I'm also using the -hmac
option. I then want to verify the signature by decrypting it and
checking the hash. The problem is the hash never seems to match.
It's unclear to me what you are trying to accomplish
, properly implemented, and assuming integrity of private keys. An
intermediary cannot play without the shared secret. You require only
trusted (possibly OOB in your scenario) publication of public keys.
--
Michael Sierchio +1 415 378 1182
PO Box 9036
Victor Duchovni wrote:
No. Without a previously arranged shared secret and no trusted introducer,
DH doesn't require anything but mutual knowledge of public
keys, since the shared secret is implicit. Either OOB or
via a trusted directory service, or a cert binding the identity
of a principal
Victor Duchovni wrote:
Bootstrapping authentication requires an out-of-band secure channel for
key exchange (or initial delivery of keys of trusted introducers).
Agreed.
__
OpenSSL Project
Richard Salz wrote:
I'm making available my small set of web pages and Perl script that
implement a self-service PKI built around OpenSSL.
Awesome, Rich! Thanks.
- M
__
OpenSSL Project
, UNIX, *BSD, etc.)? That would be the basis of fundraising
activity (I mean making phone calls, which is something nearly everyone
can do). $150,000 is not an intimidating amount for anyone who's done
fundraising.
- M
--
Michael Sierchio
On Tue, Mar 30, 2010 at 11:48 PM, P Kamath pgkam...@hotmail.com wrote:
I said it is an RNG, not cryptographic RNG. By adding current time source,
however crude, and doing a sha1/md5, why should it not be cryptoPRNG? What
properties should I look for?
Taking a hash of an entirely
Despite what others have said, RSA is perfectly reasonable (if slow) to use
for encryption. If you do, you should use OAEP/OAEP+ rather than the
common/naive method of padding.
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/oaep.html
The Wikipedia article is a good starting place
The private exponent length need only be sufficient to make a brute
force search (using the public exponent as a target) computationally
infeasible, since the discrete log problem is still in the hard
category.
Cogent DH Private Exponent recommendations are always stated in terms
of P, e.g., x :
Addendum - depending on the use of DH (usually using the DH shared
secret as a basis for key exchange), the choice of prime is more
important than private exponent length. Safe primes or strong primes
are warranted. Most systems use small generators (e.g., 2).
- M
On Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 7:25
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/DRBG_ANSI_X9-62-1998.pdf
On Tue, May 3, 2011 at 3:28 AM, Julien Poumailloux julien.p...@free.fr wrote:
Dear subscribers of the openssl-users list,
I read in the code of openssl (crypto/ec.h) that the compression of ECC
points is
Does any commercial CA still issue client certs? Most of them got out
of this business because the liability for them outstrips the revenue
benefit.
While it makes sense to have server certs issued by a commercial CA,
why would you even want client certs signed by a commercial CA? When
you are
On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 7:40 PM, Kristen J. Webb kw...@teradactyl.com wrote:
My understanding is that a TLS connection with a server cert
only identifies the server to the client. This leads to a MiTM
attack, where the mitm can impersonate the client because the server
has not verified the
On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 6:39 AM, Rick Lopes de Souza
dragonde...@gmail.com wrote:
Another thing that i know is that RSA can only sign things that are smaller
than the size of the key used.
No - you can sign a message of arbitrary length - a suitable message
digest is what is encrypted (well,
David Schwartz wrote:
For example, if you try to connect to 'www.amazon.com' and the resolver
resolvers this to '72.21.206.5', you want to get a certificate for
'www.amazon.com'. A certificate for '72.21.206.5' would not prove to the
user that he reached 'www.amazon.com' because an
Richard wrote:
if, however i:
ssl req -subj /C=US/ST=NY/L=New York ...
ssl req -subj /C=US/ST=NY/L=New\ York ...
i get an error of:
unknown option York
what am i doing wrong?
Your problem is with your shell, not OpenSSL. I'm reluctant to
say more -- I don't want
Scott Campbell wrote:
The long version: We run security check software, which makes
connections with various services, calls up the header, and then tells
us that based upon the version it read in the header, this service has
certain vulnerabilities. For security purposes, we would
Benjamin Sergeant wrote:
I'd like to know how to proceed (is it doable) to convert a PKCS #7
data (made with PKCS7_sign, flag = PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED;)
with several cert (the one from the signer) and a chain of cert, from
BER to DER encoding.
Is the decryption key present to sign the
It's September - tomatoes are good, figs are ripe, grapes
are ready to harvest and school is back in session.
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing List
Janet N wrote:
... So we need
somehow to be able to get the rsa public key from the user certificate.
Assuming a DER X.509 cert, you just need to parse out the public key:
cert-SubjectPublicKeyInfo-SubjectPublicKey
__
Urjit Gokhale wrote:
It seems that you are making the common mistake of conflating authentication
with authorization. Certs are useful in binding pubkeys to identities and
subsequently in verifying possession of the private key by being able to
perform decryption.
The SSL protocol has
Mouse wrote:
I.e. for the sake of the argument identity
Michael may have an attribute employee of Tenebras, and another
attribute permitted access to dev repository A12.
Well, the Subject Distinguished Name should have the Organization,
but I strongly disagree with you if you think access
you verify a signature with the public key, and you sign with the private key.
-Original Message-
From: Janet N [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subj: openssl verify signature with priv key?
Date: Mon 2007 Jun 25 13:17
Size: 351 bytes
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Hi there,
How do I verify a
David Latil wrote:
I have a somewhat bizarre project on my plate. I have been tasked to come up
with a secure proxy of sorts that uses SSH over SSL (I mean to actually encrypt
SSH with SSL, not just tunnel through a proxy). In the end, we would be using
port forwarding over SSH for HTTP
Yes. No. Maybe.
Such a question suggests some possible confusion.
A certificate is a binding of a keypair to an identity.
While only the public key is contained in the cert, some proof of possession of
the corresponding private key is required.
This usually requires a certificate signing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'd like to ask the group about a possible man in the middle attack over https.
What you've described (though see Viktor's post about what you didn't
really include in your message) is not MITM -- it's just a fake URL
scheme. SSL v3.0 and TLS with server auth are not
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I've a problem. I need to cypher a buffer of bytes with pkcs7 format but
I can't use certificates,i need encrypt using only a key or password.
I have searched but I do not find anything to do it.
Read the syntax for PKCS#7:
Joel Christner wrote:
The issue I'm seeing is when compiling:
mac# openssl version
OpenSSL 0.9.7l 28 Sep 2006
mac# gcc blowfish.c -o blowfish
...
Undefined symbols:
Basic C compiler/linker usage error.
gcc blowfish.c -o blowfish -Llocation of libcrypt.so -lcrypto
or something very much
Chevalier, Victor T. wrote:
I have an x509 certificate, how can I sign email with it? What is the
command?
You don't sign things with certificates, you sign them with private keys.
__
OpenSSL Project
OT: where is Rich Salz? Thanks.
__
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User Support Mailing Listopenssl-users@openssl.org
Automated List Manager
C Wegrzyn wrote:
I have to generate quite a few random keys (and iv's) during a days. It
comes out to about 1 million keys (16 bytes each) and 1 million iv's (16
bytes each).
I tried using /dev/random and /dev/urandom but in one case it blocks too
much of the time and in the other seems to run
This is a few years old, but may be useful. The code illustrates the
use of the HMAC variant on ANSI X9.17 key generation as described in the
paper, used to generate random byte strings. It uses the hash functions
in the OpenSSL libraries.
Paper:
Ted Mittelstaedt wrote:
Actually, regardless of the cipher you use, unless you have
a truly random source of numbers, your going to undermine the
strength of your encryption. For an embedded system, such a
thing has to be designed in from the get-go, as a software
PRNG is generally nowhere
\
\
etc.
- Michael Sierchio
__
OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org
User Support Mailing
Heinz Markgraf wrote:
Hi!
I would like to ask why there two pairs of RSA
functions. Would one not be enough?
What's the difference?
int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
Heinz Markgraf wrote:
Hm, I still don't get the point in having four functions.
Mathematically seen there are only two different actions I can do:
either raise the 'message' x to the power of the public exponent or
to the power of the private exponent. Right?
Operations using private keys is
Rajeshwar Singh Jenwar wrote:
How to verify a signed certificate by a CA(.pem) coresponding private
key(.pem) ?
It is just to verify that someone has played with private key or not.
You validate a certificate by performing the signature check, just
like in the city. You examine it to see
Nadav Golombick wrote:
What is the correct procedure if I come to a situation where the
password length is too big for the given buffer.
If this is a design question, then the proper thing to do IMHO
is akin to what's done for HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1 -- if the
passphrase exceeds the buffer
Raymond Popowich wrote:
One thing that I'd like some clarification on. Once I get this working,
shouldn't there be a way for me to say I only want certain client side
certificates to be able to connect to this web site? Otherwise anyone
with a client side cert can connect. I'm sure I'm
what can I do to convert a SPKAC request into a PKCS#10 ? After that
will I be able to generate a SPKAC certificate from PKCS#10 request ?
You can't.
SPKAC is a signed pubkey and challenge. PKCS10 is a different
format of self-signed object. You'd have to have the private
key present
Xie Grace Jingru-LJX001 wrote:
(1) what was just going on during the negotiation and security
connection setup? The sequence of the handshaking.
(2) Is the public key part of the certificate being passed to the
client?
(3) Did the server authenticate the client in this process? or there is
no
Wai Wu wrote:
Do the Initial Vectors on both sides have to be the same? If they have
to be the same, we not only have to exchange the key, but also the IV,
No?
Symmetric block cipher traffic contains the IV at the beginning of the
ciphertext.
Girish Venkatachalam wrote:
The IV is used only for decrypting the first block
since after that the first block serves as the IV for
the second block and so on.
To answer ur question, the IV has to be known at both
sides along with the key.
There is no sound cryptological argument for not
Wai Wu wrote:
I would like to know your opinions on commercial hardware random number
generators. Are they worth the money? How do they compare to the
/dev/random device? Thnx.
I've written extensively about this elsewhere. The devices are properly
termed RBGs (random bit generators), and
Sreeram Kandallu wrote:
Hi All,
I'm building a p2p secure communication system where each user is
identified by a RSA key.
In such a system, is it ok to use hardcoded DH params compiled into the
application, or must i generate separate dh params for every user?
Hard-coded DH parameters
Martin Witzel wrote:
My objective was twofold: I wanted to keep the external
lib API intact so that the many applications which are based
on the OpenSSL libraries could still be linked against it.
Do you return an ENOSYS for the unimplemented functions? How
are unimplemented procedures handled
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
All those certificates are valid, and are in pem and x509 format.
When I add SSLVerifyClient require in httpd.conf, a window Client
Authentication appear but I can not select any certificate!!
1- It is important I can't install the user certificate in Personal tab ?
2-
Dustin C. Locke wrote:
Thanks for the reply. I've read Netscape's SSL 3.0 draft twice...most of
the information is simply data type specification in Baukus Naur Form
with no reference to the construction of the packet itself.
It's not a packet protocol -- SSL sits atop TCP. Perhaps this is
the
Dustin C. Locke wrote:
As I understand it, SSL is a layer 4 (transport layer) protocol used in
conjunction with TCP (located slightly above TCP on the OSI heirarchy,
depending on whom you ask).
Slightly above? TCP is not part of OSI, it's TCP/IP.
I also realize that SSL objects introduce their
Charles B Cranston wrote:
It cannot be emphasized more clearly: TCP is a byte stream protocol.
This is quite true.
... There is NO WAY in TCP to indicate in
an out-of-band way that there is a 'record break'.
This is not quite true. You can certainly send OOB data
via TCP. Urgent data are read
Fiel Cabral wrote:
But if the certificate is a sub CA certificate, then is
there a way to find out? Are X.509 v1 or v2 sub CA
certificates common?
V2? Fickt nicht mit der raeketenmensch! Perhap you mean
to say V1 or V3?
If the cert is a sub-CA cert then it is not self-signed.
Unless there
Richard Levitte - VMS Whacker wrote:
v2 exists, but has seldom been used in real life...
Never seen in the wild, only in captivity.
kudzu If the cert is a sub-CA cert then it is not self-signed.
kudzu Unless there is some quantum subtlety that I am missing
kudzu here.
I don't think that was a
Michael Sierchio wrote:
have no key-usage extension
You know of course I MEANT to say basic-constraint.
If you accept a cert signer whose cert doesn't have
CertificateAuthority as a basic constraint, you are
naughty
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