I am juggling multiple deadlines and will not be responding to responses to
this post or participating in a continuing debate. But the principle of neutral
government incentives can largely reconcile recognizing the church’s right to
funds in cases like Trinity Lutheran with its right to
McCready v, Hoffius was vacated on rehearing and remanded for further
consideration of the compelling interest issue.
But I agree with Marty on the general trend. For-profit entities have not won
exemptions from discrimination laws under the RFRA standard. Most of them
should not win; for the
.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Laycock, H Douglas
(hdl5c)
Sent: Thursday, February 04, 2016 9:29 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: landlord/tenant law and RFRA
McCready v, Hoffius was vacated on rehearing and remanded for further
consi
The opinion is here. There are also two concurring opinions that for some
reason would not open.
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1284936/140453.pdf
The merits appear not to have been litigated or decided. The court says the
“only issue” is voluntary cessation. It looks like the school district
en RFRA (and state RFRAs) will
once again become far more palatable to a much broader coalition. But of
course, as Doug notes, if there's no prospect of prevailing in the
contraception and discrimination cases, then there won't be much impetus for
new RFRAs on the right.
On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 a
The cases of the sort Michael describes (and that Chris Lund has described in
public work) are still out there; they still happen. And the cases Paul
Finkelman imagines, in which state RFRAs justify all kinds of discrimination
against gays, are not out there. They have not happened.
But gay
Some of these extreme cases will involve compelling government interests,
including most of Paul's hypotheticals. But courts could not question the claim
of substantial burden on religion, according to the Zubik petitioners.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
Cases such as those Chip describes probe far too deeply into what the religious
claimant believes. And they are not the only ones. Congress tried to address
such cases in the RLUIPA amendments to RFRA, specifying that a religious
practice need not be compulsory or central to be protected. The
2, 2016, at 11:08 AM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
Cases such as those Chip describes probe far too deeply into what the religious
claimant believes. And they are not the only ones. Congress tried to address
such cases in the RLUIP
-8546
From: Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 5:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
Subject: RE: Zubik / Little Sisters - testing the scope via a hypothetical
I think their argument that courts simply cannot question
etitioners' claims are
dangerous even if the government is really trying to force them to authorize
coverage. And from your emails, it now sounds to me like that is not your
position after all (which, at least to me, is a relief!).
Eric
On Mar 22, 2016, at 2:16 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (h
Ed says I should have given you a link. Here it is:
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/433121/laycock-retracts-little-sisters?oca7c3QJEi1vSOBr.01
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
s.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Laycock, H Douglas
(hdl5c)
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Zubik / Little Sisters - testing the scope via a h
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From: Will Esser [mailto:willes...@yahoo.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2016 3:20 PM
To: Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c) <hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>>;
Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:reli
The Court wants supplemental briefing on whether the government can make the
insurance companies do this without requiring any notice or letter from the
employer.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA
opting
their own nondiscrimination polici...
Will
Will Esser --- Charlotte, North Carolina
____________
From: "Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)"
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>>
To: Paul Finkelman <paul.finkel...@yahoo.com<mailto:paul.finkel.
The North Carolina legislature also used a club (or maybe a machine gun)
instead of a scalpel. The new law goes vastly beyond fixing the problem you
focus on, and vastly beyond shower rooms and bathrooms.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law
CreditFree via Skype
________
From: "Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)" <hd...@virginia.edu>
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
Sent: Monday, March 28, 2016 8:32 PM
Subject: RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Ge
The Court held that a defendant is a "prevailing party," potentially eligible
for fees, if it prevails either on a ground going to the merits or on some
other grounds, which here included statute of limitations and the EEOC's
failure to properly investigate before filing suit.
The Court did
The only piece of information I'm aware of is that one of the government's
briefs in Zubik says there are only 87 of them.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From:
The lack of clarity in the record arises the state’s decision to pursue its
goals by indirection. Nothing in the text of the regulations prohibits refusals
to stock and deliver drugs for religious, moral, or ethical reasons. Yet
everyone understands that that is the whole point. Nothing in the
There are extremely detailed findings of fact that conclude exactly what Steve
doubts and Marty appears to deny: pharmacies fail to stock or deliver drugs,
and refer folks elsewhere, for a vast array of reasons. The district court
further found that the Commission had never, ever, interfered
This case may well be a trial lawyer’s failure to put on the evidence. Lawyers
too often think the burden on religious practice is obvious, and fail to elicit
the testimony that would clearly explain how and why the practice is religious
and important and the challenged rule is a substantial
ionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
<religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>>
on behalf of Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>>
Sent: Monday, February 20, 2017 3:37:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for La
The Standing Rock Sioux’s RFRA request for a TRO is here:
https://embed.contagiousmedia.com/embed/sub/item-ol3xgp-38nio?sb=10497046=1486655474=
They claim to own the waters of Lake Oahe, thus distinguishing unsuccessful
religious liberty claims by tribes in Lyng, Navajo Nation, and Snoqualmie.
Unanimous affirmance.
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.recent
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
___
To post,
I doubt that any one has first-hand knowledge. But I will offer two
suppositions with reasonably high confidence.
First, the insurer paying for contraception directly should have no greater
confidentiality risk than the insurer paying through the insurance plan. I
doubt that a second insurance
From: Eric J Segall [eseg...@gsu.edu]
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2016 6:09 PM
To: Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
Cc: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Noteworthy, puzzling scholars' brief in Arlene Flowers
I fail to understand
Eric is talking about disparate impact; Eugene was talking about disparate
treatment.
If someone deliberately acts on the basis of sex, race, etc., motive is
generally irrelevant. If government acts on some neutral criterion that has
disparate impact on the basis of race, sex, etc., there is
nt from my iPhone
On Oct 12, 2016, at 3:45 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
Eric is talking about disparate impact; Eugene was talking about disparate
treatment.
If someone deliberately acts on the basis of sex, race, etc., motive is
Yes. This is the closest he came to expressing an opinion that I know about.
Going into O Centro, we all wondered if those who voted for Smith would also be
hostile to the statute. It turned out that they weren’t. I think that is a
better indicator than Hobby Lobby, because that had become a
if it is secular for you.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From: Eric J Segall [mailto:eseg...@gsu.edu]
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2016 9:07 PM
To: Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c) <
I did not sign the scholars’ brief, and it is drawing about the reaction I
expected. But nothing in the brief implies anything like the Ollie’s BBQ
analogy.
The claim in the brief is that discrimination confined to one very narrow
context, an especially sensitive context with its own legal
I did not sign the scholars’ brief, and it is drawing about the reaction I
expected. But nothing in the brief implies anything like the Ollie’s BBQ
analogy.
The claim in the brief is that discrimination confined to one very narrow
context, an especially sensitive context with its own legal
There is a North Carolina case a few years ago challenging the campus police
forces of religiously affiliated universities as an Establishment Clause
violation. The NC courts upheld the police forces. That looked more like equal
treatment; this looks more like a special deal.
Douglas Laycock
Advocate Health Care does not present the question Mr. Peabody raises, or at
least not squarely. The religious hospitals there do not seek exemption under
some general guarantee of religious liberty; they seek to enforce a specific
exemption that Congress enacted. The case is about statutory
One could teach a constitutional Bible course in public schools. The odds that
they are teaching it that way in Princeton, WV seem vanishingly small. And the
story's quotations from the curriculum seem to eliminate that slim possibility.
Of course there is no constituency for teaching the
ery informative and thoughtful points and discussion.
Michael Peabody, Esq.
President,
Founders First Freedom
On Apr 21, 2017 8:13 PM, "Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)"
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
The funding question resolved in the founding generatio
list reading of
the Establishment Clause puts the underlying originalist principles out of
balance, there may be a justification for restoring the balance to honor
originalist principles at a fairly high level of generality.
Mark
Mark S. Scarberry
Pepperdine University School of Law
________
The judge denied a motion to dismiss in the Culpeper case, which now appears to
be headed for mediation.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From:
her cases involving federal jurisdiction that
Congress didn't intend 1983 to abrogate immunity. Will is only a state court
case.
Best,
Eric
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 5:40 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
Because the Court
mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
<religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>>
on behalf of Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>>
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 2:21 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for
ll is only a state court
case.
Best,
Eric
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 5:40 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
Because the Court held that neither a state, nor a state official in his
official capacity, is a “person” within
se parties (there is no "other side")
agree that the church should be eligible to compete, and the church is
receiving the requested relief?
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 4:32 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
Giving the church the tires or th
Giving the church the tires or the money would moot the case. But so far, they
have only announced a policy change, and that does not moot the case—especially
where, as here, the other side has a plausible claim and could immediately sue
the state officials to prevent them from granting the
t why does that possibility make this case -- between the church and the
agency -- justiciable, when both of those parties (there is no "other side")
agree that the church should be eligible to compete, and the church is
receiving the requested relief?
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 4:32 PM
he state's promise to treat their
grant applications in the future equally with all others is all they can get
(admittedly they'd rather have an injunction) but that seems a slender reed.
Best,
Eric
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 5:22 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.
ding and
regulation of houses of worship? If not, what else explains the change? The end
of the fight between Protestants and Catholics about public funding of
religious schools?
On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 6:24 PM Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote
I think people are aware that funding may bring more regulation. Judges tend to
defer to government conditions attached to money, even though some of those
conditions raise serious questions of unconstitutional conditions.
The fear has lost much of its force in part because of Smith and the
The funding question resolved in the founding generation was special allocation
of public funds, not part of any broader program or category, to support the
core religious functions of churches -- the salaries of clergy mostly, but also
sometimes the construction of churches, or the income from
eful for any further
information.
On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 10:21 AM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
Unless there has been some recent change in IRS policy that I don’t know about
and that Marty does not suggest, the Amendment is not li
Those are troubling hypotheticals. I don't think they are as troubling as
telling a minister, priest, or rabbi what he can preach about.
If it's just a front that does nothing but politics, it is not covered by the
bills to exempt endorsements in the ordinary course of the organization’s
8d5e4169895c9789dc742a70%7C0%7C0%7C636295397473530238=DWuE11650gg5C0Ja95yI6jYlNIR70JDYURTj5wz%2FmII%3D=0>
Alan Brownstein
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
<religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.u
Unless there has been some recent change in IRS policy that I don’t know about
and that Marty does not suggest, the Amendment is not limited to “express”
endorsements. The IRS jawboning, which is its only enforcement effort,
describes many things that it views as implicit endorsements, such as
Agreed. There is nothing of substance here. Maybe more from the agencies down
the road.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
struct his Secretaries.
Sent from my iPhone
On May 4, 2017, at 2:50 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>> wrote:
Agreed. There is nothing of substance here. Maybe more from the agencies down
the road.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distingu
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