Actually, I think this a mistake, because it misses the core reason why
Searle's argument is wrong, and repeats the mistake that he made.
(I think, btw, that this kind of situation, where people come up with
reasons against the CR arument that are not actually applicable or
relevant, is one of the reasons for the CR argument's longevity. What I
mean is: I think you are in good company here, because so many people
have come up with so many of these sorts of arguments).
The core reason for the failure of the CR is that it posits a situation
in which an intelligence is implemented on top of another intelligence:
then Searle makes an appeal to our feelings about the consciousness
feelings of the wrong consciousness in this duo (the low level one).
Can't do that: the consciousness of the top level intelligence is the
only one that is relevant. Of course, the problem is that such a
situation (one intelligence on top of another) is an exceptional case
that one cannot make "intuitive appeals" about. Searle can scream all
he wants that it makes no sense that there could be two intelligences
here, but that just means he is ignorant about what intelligence is: it
is not my job to fix Searle's ignorance.
The reason your argument is a mistake is that it also makes reference to
the conscious awareness of the low-level intelligence (at least, that is
what it appears to be doing). As such, you are talking about the wrong
intelligence, so your remarks are not relevant.
Meta comment: I too find the CR deeply boring, but alas, you brought it
up, so I had to say something ;-)
Richard Loosemore.
Benjamin Goertzel wrote:
Hi all,
Someone emailed me recently about Searle's Chinese Room argument,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room
a topic that normally bores me to tears, but it occurred to me that part
of my reply might be of interest to some
on this list, because it pertains to the more general issue of the
relationship btw consciousness and intelligence.
It also ties in with the importance of thinking about "efficient
intelligence" rather than just raw intelligence, as
discussed in the recent thread on definitions of intelligence.
Here is the relevant part of my reply about Searle:
****
However, a key point is: The scenario Searle describes is likely not
physically possible, due to the unrealistically large size of the
rulebook. The structures that we associate with intelligence (will,
focused awareness, etc.) in a human context, all come out of the need to
do intelligent processing within modest space and time requirements.
So when we say we feel like the {Searle+rulebook} system isn't really
understanding Chinese, what we mean is: It isn't understanding Chinese
according to the methods we are used to, which are methods adapted to
deal with modest space and time resources.
This ties in with the relationship btw intensity-of-consciousness and
degree-of-intelligence. In real life, these seem often to be tied
together, because the cognitive structures that correlate with intensity
of consciousness are useful ones for achieving intelligent behaviors.
However, Searle's example is pathological in the sense that it posits a
system with a high degree of intelligence associated with a
functionality that is NOT associated with any
intensity-of-consciousness. But I suggest that this pathology is due to
the unrealistically large amount of computing resources that the
rulebook requires.
I.e., it is finitude of resources that causes intelligence and
intensity-of-consciousness to be correlated. The fact that this
correlation breaks in a pathological, physically-impossible case that
requires dramatically much resources, doesn't mean too much...
****
Note that I write about intensity of consciousness rather than presence
of consciousness. I tend toward panpsychism but I do accept that "while
all animals are conscious, some animals are more conscious than others"
(to pervert Orwell). I have elaborated on this perspective considerably
in The Hidden Pattern.
-- Ben G
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