This is a continuation of the "Indescribable merde" thread, title which I had enough of.
In my previous post I explained how a purely deterministic universe ( a state machine) could not have any branching. Transitions represented in phase space would appear to be lines that never cross. If two lines join, then they stay joined for ever, since there is no mechanism for splitting them. Indeed if such a splitting mechanism did exist, then it would have to be indeterminate or "outside" this universe. Once this universe gets into a loop, then it stays in that loop for ever. Bruno Marchal has explored the concept of first person indeterminacy by means of what we may call the "Star Trek" transporter. If the transporter operates such that a person (Bruno) is transported from Brussels to both Moscow and Washington, in effect creating two copies, then, from the first person point of view, he argues, there is indeterminacy in so far as the final destination is concerned. How can that indeterminacy be reconciled with the idea of keeping the universe purely deterministic which preclude the possibility of indeterminacy? I believe that the solution to this paradox lies in the fact that the transporter is not perfect. In fact, it is the transporter that generates the indetermincy. Here is why. If the transporter was perfect, then, obviously, the copies would have to be perfect. This means they would have to include all their extensions which includes clothing, close environments and far environments. To be rigorous, let's say that all the environment withing a light cone of the observer is reproduced by the transporter such that no information can possibly be lost. Such a transporter feat would have to transform at the speed of light, both Washington and Moscow, and make them in the image of Brussels. I am not sure if this enormous feat of civil engineering would be welcome, but this is besides the point. Now, with this extended transporter operation, the copies being transported to the new Washington and the new Moscow would have no way of knowing that they are still not in Brussels! In fact, one could argue that from their point of view, the transporter has not worked and they are still in Brussels. Therefore, from the first person point of view, there is no indeterminacy! Therefore, it appears that the only way to generate indeterminacy, even first person indeterminacy, in a deterministic universe, is to allow the definition of a person's consciousness to be fuzzy. Bruno's assumption that indeterminacy can be deduced from COMP is faulty. It may be that indeterminacy is a fundamental, rather than derived property of consciousness. It may be that it is an anthropically imposed property and necessary condition for consciousness. George
