James Higgo wrote:

> Bravo, George. This is a derivation of Liebnitz's point.
>
> How many more ingenious 'solutions' will there be to the paradoxes that
> belief in a 'first person' leads to?  Quite a few I imagine, as nobody can
> countenance for a split-second that they don't exist as a 'person'. They
> absolutely insist on assuming a whole world of remembered experience of
> which they have no direct knowledge. It seems we are hard-wired not to hear
> the question, not to allow ourselves to doubt our souls for a moment.

I presume Leibnitz assumed a mechanistic universe. In fact, as I explained in
the previous post, Bruno's COMP hypothesis is different. I believe that it
assumes at the outset a certain degree of fuzziness  in the definition of a
conscious state. This fuziness which exists, not by being explicitely defined,
but, rather by a lack of defintion of the conscious state, allows a number of
consistent "future" and "past" states, where I define past and future as
possible states from or to which the current state can logically transition ( in
a consistent fashion).

Sorry James, you can't get away from dealing with the first person.

George

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