Hi George, A few questions and comments...

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George Levy wrote: > Marchal wrote: > > > But COMP implies MWI (Note that Schmidhuber and me agree on that, > > >> but we disagree on what *are* the (many) worlds MW). > > > > More precisely: COMP implies MWI in two senses. > > > > 1) Everett's sense: SE + COMP gives MW. > > He really meant SE + No( privileged observer status) -> MW. One could argue then > that No(privileged observer status) is implied by COMP. > > > 2) COMP sense: COMP gives SE + MW (my thesis, look at my CC&Q paper) > > I agree that COMP implies first person indeterminacy but, as far as I know, it > does not predict Schoedinger Equation in all its splendor, including Planck's > constant which is a parameter in this equation. So would it be more accurate to > say COMP implies Indeterminacy + MW? > > > > > [BM] I pretend that with comp a world is a > > first person (plural) construct. [Schmidhuber] does not defined them but he > > associates > > them with their generating programs. Observers belongs to worlds, with > > Schmidhuber. I pretend with comp that observers's infered worlds are > > defined by the set of the consistent extensions. > > I assume "consistent extensions" means "logically consistent extensions of the > observers". In which case we agree fully on the meaning of worlds. Schmidhuber, > just like Mallah, is stuck with the third person perspective. [SPK] I agree, but it seems that people are "stuck" trying to define the first person perspective... > > [GL] >Again to clarify... the word "machine" means that consciousness arises > > from > > >simple (Turing-like) computations. This is the COMP hypothesis. > > > > [BM] In first approximation YES. In second approximation NOT REALLY. > > By comp I mean I survive with an artificial digital brain/body/universe. > > As a counter-intuitive conclusion, consciousness does not really > > supervenes on a computation but on an infinite cloud of "similar" > > computations existing in UD*. [SPK] It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable" in its behaviour. Have you read Peter Wegner's papers about this? > I have reached almost the same conclusion, that our consciousness come about from > an ensemble of more or less identical "points" or states in the plenitude and the > "thickness" of this ensemble is a measure of the Heisenberg uncertainty. The > difference is that you call them "computation." I view them more as instantaneous > static entities which are logically connected to each other. Maybe we could > resolve this issue by saying that I focus on the points of the graph and you, on > the links :-) [SPK] Could you elaborate on the nature of this "logical connection?" > > [BM] Locally a brain/body/universe only makes it > > possible for a person (the one conscious) to accelerate himself > > relatively to its most probable possible extensions. Note that this gives > > a role to consciousness : self-speeding up abilities. > > And this is linked to another result by Godel. If you add an undecidable > > true statement to the theory (in which that sentence is undecidable), not > > only an infinity of new formula become decidable, but an infinity of > > provable formula get shorter proofs. > > > > You are accelerating too fast for me... I don't understand this at all. > > > > > >I am not sure I understand "shared computational histories". Why would past > > >computational states be relevant? A current state could be reached from > > >different past points (OMs) unless "merging" is not allowed > > > > Merging is allowed through amnesia. In some sense personal memories > > help you to stay into no merging histories. > > I smell a whiff of third person thinking. I'll say something, then I'll retract > it because I just don't have the words to say it straight. An observer in world A > who has a "false" memory (of something that did not happen in world A), is in > the same mental state as an observer in world B who has a true memory ( of > something that happended in world B). The two observers are in exactly identical > states, even though their "shared histories" are different. The point is that > their mental states are the same, they have the same consciousness, they are > really the same observer and they are really in the same world. > Now I can retract what I said. There is no world A and B and there is no shared > history. The important thing is only the current state of the observer(s). The > extensions to the observer are fuzzy. > > > [GL] >...Isn't the current state only of relevance? > > > > Relevance with respect to what? A state is not enough, you need a > > universal machine to support it. > > Precisely. With respect to us!. We are the machine....it's a vicious circle...we > are self emergent...Not only is our world anthropically defined, but we ourselves > also are.... > > > It is more "sharing a common history" like the bifurcation W and M. > > Biological multiplication gives a simple model of tree like > > developpement where individuals share a long common history. The more you > > leave the leaves (!) the more the histories are shared. This is an image > > because both with comp and/or QM, we must take into account merging. > > (I know you agree with that). > > >From inside UD* (i.e. from the average first person point of view of > > machines) I make the conjecture that there is no ultimate well-defined > > trunk for these barnches and leaves. From the third person view there > > is one which is just the trivial one: UD. > > > > Your use of the words "shared histories" partially seem to carry some old > fashioned baggage from the days when time was thought to be linear. Yet you do > accept the concept of bifurcation and merging... > > Can conventional mechanics support consciousness spliting and merging? I don't > think so. Here is why. > There are two cases to consider: state machines in the continuum and state > machines in discrete space. > > In phase space with the cardinality of the continuum, each point has a unique > past and a unique future. Another way to say this is that if we could make state > machine with continuous states, each machine state would have a unique antecedent > and a unique future. Except at singularities, no crossing is allowed in continuous > phase space... transition lines could get arbitrairly close to each other but > could never reach each other. .I would look at state machines transitions more > like a fluid flow. Singularities could have no future because any future would be > indeterminate. Given their indeterminate future, their past would also be > questionable if we are willing to accept time reversal. [SPK] Your phase space seems to be topologically "simply-connected," why? There is a theorem by M.C. Mackey and another fellow whose name escapes me that shows that a phase space of an invertible system can have "traces" (subsets) that are isomorphic to phase spaces of irriversible systems. This have some bearing on what you wrote here... > Phase space transitions in discrete space, however, can merge. Once merged, they > stay merged forever. Splitting is not allowed. State machines can reach the same > state from different states. Once in similar state they stay similar. > otherwise, it would generate indeterminacy. > > The point is that merging seems to be possible but splitting is difficult. You > could have splitting of consciousness, if, instead of considering consciousness as > a single point represented by definite states, you are willing to consider a fuzzy > region comprised of a multitude of points. Then any transitions out of this region > would be "splitting" This type of consciousness fuzzy region) would make > indeterminacy MANDATORY! In practice the existence of this fuzzy region is hinted > at by Planck's constant. > > > > > > > [GL] >Why the word "projection?" > > > > [BM] Or "common anticipation". Like F=ma, or SE, ... We take it as a trunk, > > when it is perhaps just a branch. See above. > > > > Ok. I call this, "common frame of reference." > > George Kindest regards, Stephen