A question: If the mind (of a person) is dependent on a QM state in someway,
would this make this paradox mute?
George Levy wrote:
> James Higgo wrote:
> > Bravo, George. This is a derivation of Liebnitz's point.
> > How many more ingenious 'solutions' will there be to the paradoxes that
> > belief in a 'first person' leads to? Quite a few I imagine, as nobody can
> > countenance for a split-second that they don't exist as a 'person'. They
> > absolutely insist on assuming a whole world of remembered experience of
> > which they have no direct knowledge. It seems we are hard-wired not to hear
> > the question, not to allow ourselves to doubt our souls for a moment.
> I presume Leibnitz assumed a mechanistic universe. In fact, as I explained in
> the previous post, Bruno's COMP hypothesis is different. I believe that it
> assumes at the outset a certain degree of fuzziness in the definition of a
> conscious state. This fuziness which exists, not by being explicitely defined,
> but, rather by a lack of defintion of the conscious state, allows a number of
> consistent "future" and "past" states, where I define past and future as
> possible states from or to which the current state can logically transition ( in
> a consistent fashion).
> Sorry James, you can't get away from dealing with the first person.