Bravo, George. This is a derivation of Liebnitz's point. How many more ingenious 'solutions' will there be to the paradoxes that belief in a 'first person' leads to? Quite a few I imagine, as nobody can countenance for a split-second that they don't exist as a 'person'. They absolutely insist on assuming a whole world of remembered experience of which they have no direct knowledge. It seems we are hard-wired not to hear the question, not to allow ourselves to doubt our souls for a moment.
----- Original Message ----- From: George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, March 16, 2001 6:44 PM Subject: Re: Transporter Paradox > This is a continuation of the "Indescribable merde" thread, title which I had enough > of. > > In my previous post I explained how a purely deterministic universe ( a state machine) > could not have any branching. Transitions represented in phase space would appear to > be lines that never cross. If two lines join, then they stay joined for ever, since > there is no mechanism for splitting them. Indeed if such a splitting mechanism did > exist, then it would have to be indeterminate or "outside" this universe. Once this > universe gets into a loop, then it stays in that loop for ever. > > Bruno Marchal has explored the concept of first person indeterminacy by means of what > we may call the "Star Trek" transporter. If the transporter operates such that a > person (Bruno) is transported from Brussels to both Moscow and Washington, in effect > creating two copies, then, from the first person point of view, he argues, there is > indeterminacy in so far as the final destination is concerned. > > How can that indeterminacy be reconciled with the idea of keeping the universe purely > deterministic which preclude the possibility of indeterminacy? > > I believe that the solution to this paradox lies in the fact that the transporter is > not perfect. In fact, it is the transporter that generates the indetermincy. Here is > why. > > If the transporter was perfect, then, obviously, the copies would have to be > perfect. This means they would have to include all their extensions which includes > clothing, close environments and far environments. To be rigorous, let's say that all > the environment withing a light cone of the observer is reproduced by the transporter > such that no information can possibly be lost. > > Such a transporter feat would have to transform at the speed of light, both > Washington and Moscow, and make them in the image of Brussels. I am not sure if this > enormous feat of civil engineering would be welcome, but this is besides the point. > Now, with this extended transporter operation, the copies being transported to the > new Washington and the new Moscow would have no way of knowing that they are still not > in Brussels! In fact, one could argue that from their point of view, the transporter > has not worked and they are still in Brussels. Therefore, from the first person point > of view, there is no indeterminacy! > > Therefore, it appears that the only way to generate indeterminacy, even first person > indeterminacy, in a deterministic universe, is to allow the definition of a person's > consciousness to be fuzzy. Bruno's assumption that indeterminacy can be deduced from > COMP is faulty. It may be that indeterminacy is a fundamental, rather than derived > property of consciousness. It may be that it is an anthropically imposed property and > necessary condition for consciousness. > > George > > >
