[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Georges Quénot wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> Georges Quénot wrote:
>>>> 1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
>>>> equations of which a "Harry Potter universe" including
>>>> a counterpart of you would be a solution.
>>> 1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some
>>> very long number
>> Unlike some others I did not introduce representations.
>> One cannot represent "any configuration of material bodies"
>> by a number with an infinite precision however long the number.
>> As some mentioned also, you would need a (de)coding scheme.
> If numbers don't represent material, then somehow they mus *be*
> material bodies.
In a mathematical-monist view, yes. But everything is in
the "somehow" (maybe also in what you mean by "numbers").
You should not think of a greedy correspondence.
> And if they can't do either, Mathematical Monism fails. And if
> they can, you have the Harry Potter problem.
What it might mean that "they can (or can't)" could be more
subtle than you imagine. From *my* viewpoint there is no
problem in either case.
> Unless only one
> mathemical object is instantiated. But that isn't monism.
Indeed. And monism is not that all are instantiated (that
would just be a different dualism), it is that instanciation
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