[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... > Different levels of Causality > > Brain processes are enacting things which are *mathematical* in nature > - 'algorithms' (See 'Functionalism'). Mathematical entities are > abstracted patterns. But abstracted patterns themselves (like > 'algorithms') don't exist directly inside physical causal networks, > only particular instances of them do. This is clear by pointing to the > fact that many different brains could enact the *same* computation > (algorithm) - the philosophical term is that the algorithm is 'multiply > realizable'. So the particular physical processes in the brain can't > be *identical* to the mathematical entity (the algorithm) itself.
But is it true that different brains can implement the same algorithm? It seems it is only true because we abstract a certain algorithm from it's various representation, e.g. as written on paper. Every actual realization, in brains or computer or on paper is actually slightly different at a microscopic level at least. We call it "the same algorithm" because we're abstracting a common functionality or purpose. > > It was an argument similar to this that led to the demise of the > original 'Identity Theory' of mind (a theory which attempted to > identity mental states with physical processes). Again, the trouble is > that many different brain states could be associated with the *same* > algorithm (or have the same mental states) which shows that physical > processes cannot be identified with mathematical entities in any simple > way. But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair exists; as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular chair. >The weaker 'Token Identity' theories concede this, but still > attempt to equate mental states with physical processes. Couldn't one > simply say that there's some general high-level properties of physical > matter which can be equated with the algorithm, and hence dispense with > ghostly mathematical entities? The reason one can't really say this > boils down to Occam's razor and inference to the best explanation > again. Attempting to replace the concept of 'algorithm' with some high > level properties of physical matter is results in descriptions that are > enormously complex and unwieldy. But you can look at it the other way around. The "algorithm" is already the general high-level property that is common to all the brains and computers implementing. .... > > The Mathematico-Cognition Ontology This looks more like botany than ontology. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
