>But is it true that different brains can implement the same algorithm?  It 
>seems it
is only true because we abstract a certain algorithm from it's various
representation, e.g. as written on paper.  Every actual realization, in
brains or
computer or on paper is actually slightly different at a microscopic
level at least.
We call it "the same algorithm" because we're abstracting a common
functionality or

The algorithm *is* the abstract functionality.  So yes, of course
different brains implement the same algorithm

>But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair 
>as a abstraction from chairs.  So chair isn't identical with any particular 

It's not *just* the fact that mathematical objects exist in the sense
that  for instance the 'chair' concept exists, its this fact *combined*
with my other arguments (for instance the argument from
indispensibility) that rebut reductive materialism.

>This looks more like botany than ontology.
>Brent Meeker

Try to see what I'm looking to do here.  From my 1st semester Java

'Object-oriented programs are *models* of reality'

Pretend that I'm looking to write a 'progam' sufficiently general to
(in principle) model all of reality - or at least the parts of reality
in which minds can exist.

Look at the attempt to construct a 'theory of everything' as an
exercise in systems analysis.  What's the first thing you want to do to
create a software system?  You first have to identify the fundamental
actors that you're looking to model.

In this case, the software system we're looking for must be capable of
(in principle) modelling all of reality.  So... let's classify and
define the 'metaphysical actors'.     Then they can be implemented as
classes and objects in object-oriented programs...

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