thanks for the detailed reply with the agreement against Ccnss being sort-of
a self-awareness. Unfortunately I cannot get to your book for the time being
(we made a solemn oath with my wife at our 50th NOT to buy any more books,
rather get rid of most of them) and our excellent publ library does not
provide the fresh editions).
On Nagel's bat (and later in JCS Hameroff-Penrose's 'worm') I wrote my
objection that WE want to understand with OUR level ideation the mental
functions of a bat or a worm - of course we cannot. So I seek a better (or
none?!) definition than a comparison to those.
And a consensus on Ccness will never set in as long as diverse "researchers"
get grants (awards, tenure, etc.) and publish books with the diverse
identifications - theories (against all other ones). See the 15 year
success of the Tucson Conferences.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM
Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
> On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally
> > agreed-upon description of "consciousness" - applied in the lit as all
> > variations of an unidentified "thing" anyone needs to his theory.
> > I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides'
> > directs activity accordingly. I identified it as "acknowledgement of and
> > response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory
> > but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent
> > to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is
> > one's feeling of SELF (of "I") (which makes sense).
> We'll probably be old men (QTI-like ancient) by the time there is any
> concensus on the subject.
> I operationally define consciousness in terms of Bostrom's
> "reference class" - ie the property of there being something for it be
> like (references of Nagel's What is to be like bat - if bats are
> consciousm the question is answerable, if not then there is nothing
> that it is like to be a bat).
> Note that this is _not_ equivalent to self-awareness, which is the
> "feeling of self" you talk about. Mind you, self-awareness does seem
> to be necessary for consciousness in order to prevent the Occam
> catastrophe, which I mention in my book, and probably on this list.
> Process is covered by my "TIME" postulate, which I've been
> deliberately somewhat vague on. It essentially says that experienced
> observer moments can be placed into an ordered set (mathematical
> notion of ordering - for every experienced observer moment, all other
> experienced moments must exist in the past or the future of that one).
> This leaves open a wide variety of time structures (continuous,
> discrete, rational and so on), and indeed all structures called
> timescales is included. However, it dismisses things like 2D time, so
> it could potentially be wrong.
> > You wrote a less controversial variation in your post;
> > "... I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. ..."
> > which (being conscious) is part of the picture, I miss the activity in
> > just as in the 'feeling of "I".
> > (Tied to: 'being conscious OF..., i.e. awareness, what many identify
> > the entire chapter.)
> > Unfortunately the word is so deeply anchored in the multimillennial
> > that we cannot get rid of this noumenon. We could talk about the
> > 'ingredients' by themselves and agree, the ominous Ccness term is a good
> > platform for eternal debates. Also for grants.
> > I join you in disproving of assigning total meaning to simplified tools
> > allegedly active in the mental concept, like a QM abstraction.
> > John M
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> > Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:25 PM
> > Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument
> > >
> > > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make
> > difference between
> > > > consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently
> > living through a virtual
> > >
> > > Sure, but I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. Yet the
> > > fact remains that I do.
> > >
> > > Until we have a better idea of the mechanisms behind consciousness, it
> > > is a little too early to rule out any specific conclusion. I think
> > > Penrose and Lockwood are dead wrong in their specific quantum
> > > mechanical connections with consciousness, but I retain a suspicion
> > > that quantum effects are important in some way.
> > >
> > > --
> > > *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
> > > is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
> > > virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
> > > email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
> > > may safely ignore this attachment.
> > >
> > --
> > > A/Prof Russell Standish
> > > Australia
> > http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> > > International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
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