Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > But c breaks down into:
> > > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> > > physics
> > > and
> > > c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
> > >
> > > The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
> > > configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But
> > > I only experience c1.
> > That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write
> > this...
> I could have experienced periods of causal
> stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during
> of the stable periods.
Well in typical Everett MWI you also could...
> > and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which
> > means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at
> > least one) of you will experience it.
> Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW
> --. not physical MW.
But why ? consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor ! In any
case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not
about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of "what
happens" at the time a choice is made. Even an infinitesimal probability
is "instantiated" with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not
prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as
real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins...
> > Be it a mathematical MW or physical MW.
> Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be
> deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have
> a solution?
Several ways of defining one has been discussed on this list for a long time
now see ASSA vs RSSA, see the Universal Distribution, etc.
> > Now if you say HP/WR are not possible in classical everett MWI, please
> > explain how...
> Some are ruled out -- because quantum laws are still laws -- some
> aren't. PMW is narrower than MMW, but still broader than SW.
> > Now if you don't agree with MW theories then it seems you are
> > stuck explaining why the real is only composed of that and not this...
> 1. If everything is contingent, there are contingent facts.
> 2. If everything is necessary...it is a contingent fact that
> everything is necessary...so there is still at least one
> contingent fact.
> 3. You can't avoid contingency.
I don't understand what you mean by this, I apology.
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