Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Jeudi 26 Octobre 2006 18:02, 1Z a écrit :
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > But c breaks down into:
> > > > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> > > > physics
> > > > and
> > > > c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
> > > >
> > > > The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
> > > > configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But
> > > > I only experience c1.
> > >
> > > That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write
> > > this...
> > I could have experienced periods of causal
> > stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during
> > one
> > of the stable periods.
> Well in typical Everett MWI you also could...
Mixtures of stability and craziness are mathematically necessary.
> > > and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which
> > > means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at
> > > least one) of you will experience it.
> > Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW
> > --. not physical MW.
> But why ?
It doesn't exlain my expreience.
> consequences on HP/WR are exactly the same on both flavor !
No they are not. In PMW you can choose measure to match
> In any
> case you have to have a measure function, in both case probability is not
> about what happens and what doesn't but the relative proportion of "what
> happens" at the time a choice is made.
In an MMW, measure cannot be chosen to match experience, empirically,
it has to be deduced apriori.
> Even an infinitesimal probability
> is "instantiated" with 100% chance in MW. Since quantum mechanics does not
> prevent very weird events from occuring, those events then occur and are as
> real as this real. The chance to win the lottery is low, yet some wins...
MMW may not be able to give strange events a lower probability
than everyday ones. PMW can do this because it leans
on the SWE, but that is arrived at empirically.
> > > Be it a mathematical MW or physical MW.
> > Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be
> > deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have
> > a solution?
> Several ways of defining one has been discussed on this list for a long time
> now see ASSA vs RSSA, see the Universal Distribution, etc.
I know attempts have been made. But it is more difficult if everything
has to be done apriori.
> > > Now if you say HP/WR are not possible in classical everett MWI, please
> > > explain how...
> > Some are ruled out -- because quantum laws are still laws -- some
> > aren't. PMW is narrower than MMW, but still broader than SW.
> > > Now if you don't agree with MW theories then it seems you are
> > > stuck explaining why the real is only composed of that and not this...
> > 1. If everything is contingent, there are contingent facts.
> > 2. If everything is necessary...it is a contingent fact that
> > everything is necessary...so there is still at least one
> > contingent fact.
> > 3. You can't avoid contingency.
> I don't understand what you mean by this, I apology.
The ultimate explanation for "why the real is only composed of that and
is contingency. Contingency isn't a very satisfactory explanation to
rationalist mind...but contingency is very hard to avoid entirely.
> Quentin Anciaux
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