Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > But c breaks down into:
> > c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of
> > physics
> > and
> > c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff.
> > The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible
> > configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But
> > I only experience c1.
> That means nothing... if you had experienced c2 you would never write this...
I could have experienced periods of causal
stability mixed with periods of HP. I could still communicate during
of the stable periods.
> and in physical MW, HP/WR are not ruled out but of very low measure which
> means there is 100% chance that some instance (a tiny tiny number but at
> least one) of you will experience it.
Yes, yes, yes. I am objecting here to everythingism -- mathematical MW
--. not physical MW.
> Be it a mathematical MW or physical MW.
Measure is a lot more difficult in MMW. It has to be
deprived by apriori necessity. Do you have
> Now if you say HP/WR are not possible in classical everett MWI, please
> explain how...
Some are ruled out -- because quantum laws are still laws -- some
aren't. PMW is narrower than MMW, but still broader than SW.
> Now if you don't agree with MW theories then it seems you are
> stuck explaining why the real is only composed of that and not this...
1. If everything is contingent, there are contingent facts.
2. If everything is necessary...it is a contingent fact that
everything is necessary...so there is still at least one
3. You can't avoid contingency.
> Quentin Anciaux
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