Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):

> A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
> of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more 
> controversial.

Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't 
know people who object to comp.
Of course someone like Searle could gives the feeling that he dislike 
comp, but its own reasoning, if you read it carefully, proves that he 
accept comp, albeit only for low substitution level unlike most 
Now as you know comp is my working hypothesis so this is for me just a 
bit out of my topic. Remember that for postulating "not-comp" you have 
to introduce high infinities in the third person description of the 
brain/body. In particular you have to abandon QM, or any theory ever 
proposed in physics and cognitive science.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to