Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 31-oct.-06, à 19:37, 1Z a écrit : > > > Well, I think numbers don't exist AT ALL.... > > I have not the slightest idea what you mean by that.
If you don't understand anti-Platonism, that would certainly explain why you don't argue against it. > Your longer > "metaphysics" post begs many of the questions addressed in this list. > Personally: I have no theory, just an argument showing that if we take > the "yes doctor" seriously enough then there is no primitive physical > objects AT ALL(**), and then I show how to recover constructively the > stable appearances of physical objects, and this in a precise > empirically verifiable way(*). > (And to be sure, I have always expected to get a refutation, but > instead the theory has been confirmed until now. Of course QM, loop > gravity and string theories are still in advance for the physical stuff > but (a)comp is in advance for the explanation of the quanta-qualia > relations, (and more generally the relation between all point of views > (n-persons, hypostases) I would say). > > Bruno > > (*) This makes me an empirist, but I do not subscribe to "math is > physics" form of empiry. It belongs more on the type "physics" is > mathematics as seen from some internal observer-universal machine. > (**) More precisely: such a notion of primitive physical objects can no > more be invoked for justifying the appearances of physical laws. Just as I have an argument that Platonically existing mathematical objects are not needed to explain mathematics or anything else. > BTW (a minor detail) rational numbers are also dense, but are > constructive objects. Cf your long post. > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
