Quentin Anciaux writes:
> But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to see > where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally > identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only in > dualistic framework it is possible to imagine a functionnally equivalent to > human yet lacking consciousness, the other way is that functionnally > equivalence *requires* consciousness (you can't have functionnally > equivalence without consciousness). I think it is logically possible to have functional equivalence but structural difference with consequently difference in conscious state even though external behaviour is the same. Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
