Quentin Anciaux writes:

> But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to see 
> where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally 
> identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only in 
> dualistic framework it is possible to imagine a functionnally equivalent to 
> human yet lacking consciousness, the other way is that functionnally 
> equivalence *requires* consciousness (you can't have functionnally 
> equivalence without consciousness).

I think it is logically possible to have functional equivalence but structural 
difference with consequently difference in conscious state even though 
external behaviour is the same. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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