Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

>>> Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain
>>> activity, not Turing emulable.
>> Nooooo....... True: Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result
>> of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle pretend that brain is not
>> turing emulable. He just implicitly assume there is a notion of
>> actuality that no simulation can render, but does not address the
>> question of emulability. Then Searle is known for confusing level of
>> description (this I can make much more precise with the Fi and Wi, or
>> with the very important difference between computability (emulability)
>> and provability.
> Searle seems to accept that CT implies the brain is Turing emulable, 
> but he
> does not believe that such an emulation would capture consciousness any
> more than a simulation of a thunderstorm will make you wet. Thus, a 
> computer
> that could pass the Turing Test would be a zombie.

Yes. It confirms my point. And Searle is coherent, he has to refer to a 
notion of "physically real" for his non-computationalism to proceed.
He may be right. Now his naturalistic explanation of consciousness 
seems rather ad hoc.
But all what I say is that IF comp is correct, we have to abandon 

> Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - but 
> he does
> believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI either.

Yes. In that way Searle is "not even wrong".

<snip: see my preceding post to you>

> If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations, 
> how
> does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?

I guess I miss something (or you miss your statement?). Is it not 
obvious that "if there are more arbitrary sequences than third person 
computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences are not 

Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is 
computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates 
specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and 
nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem 
the set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable 
sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.

Does it mean there is no program capable of generating a non computable 

Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite 
sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by special 
purpose, specific,  program) and the non computable one (how? by 
generating them all).

I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer 
scientist told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits 
capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of 
length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.
Of course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable of 
generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,  
But it is really easy to write a little  program capable of generating 
that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: the 
program COUNT is enough.

I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a 
miniature version of it if you want.

Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third 
person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable 
stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable 
one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of 
any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself 
into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at 
the start.

A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics, except 
that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter 
universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).

I am not satisfied by this answer if only because my motivation is to 
understand where that quantum comes from.

Is complex randomization of histories the only way to force normal 
nature into the shorter path?

Well, my point is that if we take comp seriously, we have to justify 
the absence of rabbits from computer science. In case too much white 
rabbits remains, comp would be false, and this would be an argument in 
favor of materialism. But, when you interview a universal machine on 
this question you can realize at least that this question is far from 
being settled.

Hope you don't mind I continue to comment your post tomorrow,



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