Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>> Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>>>> Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain
>>>>> activity, not Turing emulable.
>>>> Nooooo....... True: Searle's theory is that consciousness is a result
>>>> of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle pretend that brain is not
>>>> turing emulable. He just implicitly assume there is a notion of
>>>> actuality that no simulation can render, but does not address the
>>>> question of emulability. Then Searle is known for confusing level of
>>>> description (this I can make much more precise with the Fi and Wi, or
>>>> with the very important difference between computability (emulability)
>>>> and provability.
>>> Searle seems to accept that CT implies the brain is Turing emulable, 
>>> but he
>>> does not believe that such an emulation would capture consciousness any
>>> more than a simulation of a thunderstorm will make you wet. Thus, a 
>>> computer
>>> that could pass the Turing Test would be a zombie.
>> Yes. It confirms my point. And Searle is coherent, he has to refer to a 
>> notion of "physically real" for his non-computationalism to proceed.
>> He may be right. Now his naturalistic explanation of consciousness 
>> seems rather ad hoc.
>> But all what I say is that IF comp is correct, we have to abandon 
>> physicalism.
>>> Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - but 
>>> he does
>>> believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI either.
>> Yes. In that way Searle is "not even wrong".
> Meaning what? I thought you agreed his position was coherent.
>> <snip: see my preceding post to you>
>>> If there are more arbitrary sequences than third person computations, 
>>> how
>>> does it follow that arbitrary sequences are not computations?
>> I guess I miss something (or you miss your statement?). Is it not 
>> obvious that "if there are more arbitrary sequences than third person 
>> computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences are not 
>> computations".
> OK, but my concern was to find room in the arbitrary sequences for all 
> computations, not the other way around (perhaps I didn't make this clear). 
> Every rational number is also a real number. 
>> Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is 
>> computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates 
>> specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and 
>> nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem 
>> the set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable 
>> sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.
>> Does it mean there is no program capable of generating a non computable 
>> sequence?
>> Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite 
>> sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by special 
>> purpose, specific,  program) and the non computable one (how? by 
>> generating them all).
>> I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer 
>> scientist told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits 
>> capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of 
>> length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.
>> Of course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable of 
>> generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,  
>> But it is really easy to write a little  program capable of generating 
>> that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: the 
>> program COUNT is enough.
>> I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a 
>> miniature version of it if you want.
> Yes, and there are many related examples, like Borges' library; I would 
> include 
> the computations that might be hiding in noise as another such example. The 
> significant thing in all these cases is that from the third person 
> perspective, the 
> information or computation is inaccessible. You need to have the book you 
> want 
> already before you can find it in the Library of Babel. However, if 
> computations 
> (or books) can be conscious, then they will still be conscious despite being 
> unable 
> to communicate with the world at the level of their implementation. The first 
> person 
> perspective makes these situations non-trivial.

Or you may regard it as a reductio against the proposition that a consciousness 
can be encapsulated.  Perhaps consciousness is only relative to an open system. 
 If the universe started from nothing, or very little in terms of information, 
then the unitary evolution of the wave function preserves information.  Hence 
the information of the universe is very small.  The apparent information, 
including that which describes conscious processes, is a consequence of 
projecting out onto a reduced basis.
>> Now, when you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the third 
>> person mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.
>> But from the first person point of view, a priori the uncountable 
>> stories, indeed generated by the UD, take precedence on the computable 
>> one: thus the continua of white rabbits. This results from the lack of 
>> any possibility from the first person point of view to locate herself 
>> into UD*. Somehow the first person belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories at 
>> the start.
> Can you explain again why only the countable stories appear to the 3rd person 
> but the 1st person sees the uncountable ones as well? Also, why should the 
> white rabbits prefer the uncountable habitat?
>> A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum mechanics, except 
>> that here the physicist as an easy answer: white rabbits and Potter 
>> universe are eliminated through phase randomization (apparently).
>> I am not satisfied by this answer if only because my motivation is to 
>> understand where that quantum comes from.
>> Is complex randomization of histories the only way to force normal 
>> nature into the shorter path?
>> Well, my point is that if we take comp seriously, we have to justify 
>> the absence of rabbits from computer science. In case too much white 
>> rabbits remains, comp would be false, and this would be an argument in 
>> favor of materialism. But, when you interview a universal machine on 
>> this question you can realize at least that this question is far from 
>> being settled.
> If QM emerges from comp, does that solve the problem?
>> Hope you don't mind I continue to comment your post tomorrow,
> I appreciate that you are taking the time to reply to my posts; even though 
> you are probably repeating yourself, I think I understand things a little 
> better 
> every time.

Me too - I think. :-)

Brent Meeker

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