Jason Resch wrote: > On 1/28/07, *Stathis Papaioannou* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: > > > Consciousness *seems* to be continuous even if at a fundamental level > time or brain processes are discrete. Also, although I agree that > there is no necessary connection between observer moments, there > *seems* to be a connection, in that almost by definition I won't > suddenly find myself turning Chinese in the next moment even though > there are 50 times as many Chinese as Australians in the world. If > the feeling that I remain the same person from moment to moment is an > illusion, then I am interested in how that illusion can be > maintained, regardless of the underlying mechanisms of consciousness, > time, whether or not there exists a real world, and so on. > > > > I think the reason the illusion is maintained is rather trivial, > whenever your brain has the thought: "How come I was born as Stathis > Papaioannou, and only ever remember being Stathis Papaioannou?" Your > brain is limited to the memories contained within it. And since > there is no way for your brain to have integrated memories of what it > is like to be other observers, your illusion of personal identity is > maintained. > > > > > Either I'm one of few or one of many. If everyone guesses that they > are one of many, more are going to be right than if everyone guesses > that they are one of few. Therefore, I should guess that I'm one of > many. Is that what you are suggesting? > > > Yes, and once we assume we are probably one of many similar or > identical observer-moments, we should ask "Why should there be many?" > > > > The argument has some appeal assuming we have no other reason to > favour guessing that we are one of many or one of few. However, lack > of evidence against something does not necessarily mean that thing is > likely or even possible. As it happens there is perhaps some evidence > for MW from quantum mechanics, but were it not for this, we could > easily class MW along with pink elephants as something very unlikely > which cannot be rescued by the ASSA. > > > If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many histories > lines (and copies of you) must have been created by now. The > universe had been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold > numbers of times each second, for billions of years before you were > born. While not every branch contains you, once you appeared in one > history line, a new copy of you has been created for every possible > outcome of every quantum event that happens anywhere in this > universe.
I don't think this is the way to look at it. It's true that QM predicts an uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an universe containing only a single unstable particle. But these branchings don't produce different copies of Stathis. As a big macroscopic object he is described by a reduced density matrix that has only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable entity against these microscopic quantum events unless they are amplified so as to change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a geiger counter click. The microscopic events just add a little fuzz to his reduced density matrix - and the same for all of the classical world. You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story "Singleton" which is available online: ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html Egan says "People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to want to take it seriously, let alone personally." So he wrote a story in which it is taken personally. Brent Meeker >I would be astonished if many-worlds turned out to be > false, not only because of ASSA, but also due to due to the paradoxes > that exist in other interpretations, and David Deutsch's reasoning > that the computations of a quantum computer must be done somewhere, > and single-world views cannot explain, for example, how Shor's > algorithm works. > > From a mathematical/computational perspective a many-world universe > has only marginally more complicated description (program) than a > universe that has a one-to-one mapping of states. > > For a simple example of how this is possible, consider the Fibonacci > sequence, defined as: F(0) = 1 F(1) = 1 F(n>1) = F(n-1) + F(n-2) > > But a sequence that defines an exponentially growing number of states > can be made just by changing the + to a plus or minus: F(0) = 1 F(1) > = 1 F(n>1) = F(n-1) ± F(n-2) > > Therefore mathematical descriptions of universes like our own should > be common, and only slightly rarer than universes that lack the > property of many-worlds. However, many-worlds universes define so > many more states, and so many more observers that most of reality > should be generated by short programs that define massive numbers of > states before halting. An interesting question: What about programs > that loop, would observers and states in such a universe have an > infinite measure or should looping be treated the same as halting? > > Jason > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
