Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> 
>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  > > Brent Meeker writes:
>  > >
>  > > > > > This raises the question again of "what is the minimum 
> duration of a
>  > > > > conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
>  > > > > coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses 
> for that
>  > > > > 5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. 
> There's not
>  > > > > much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring
>  > > > > hundreds of times over in different brains.
>  > > > > >
>  > > > > > Brent Meeker
>  > > > >
>  > > > > I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of 
> the order
>  > > > > of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at least
>  > > this
>  > > > > long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum 
> duration
>  > > > > for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up
>  > > > > arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments)
>  > > leaving
>  > > > > the experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. 
> Suppose you
>  > > > > are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a
>  > > distant
>  > > > > place. Once you materialise, your neurons will continue their
>  > > processing
>  > > > > of the red flash for another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 
> msec
>  > > > > after being shown the flash) you will perceive it. Next, 
> suppose that
>  > > > > you have no past but are created at the teleportation receiving
>  > > station
>  > > > > from information *as if* you had been shown a red flash 99 msec 
> ago.
>  > > > > Your newly-created brain will process information for another 1
>  > > msec and
>  > > > > then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this case 
> you have
>  > > > > only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the 
> experiment to
>  > > > > make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an
>  > > observer
>  > > > > moment can actually be instantaneous?
>  > > > >
>  > > > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  > > >
>  > > > This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian
>  > > theatre in which the brain does some processing *and then* you (the
>  > > really real you) perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in
>  > > "Consciousness Explained". The perception must be the processing and
>  > > even if the flash is very short and it's perceived duration is very
>  > > short, the brain processes producing that perception can be much 
> longer.
>  > > >
>  > > > Brent Meeker
>  > >
>  > > Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case 
> where you
>  > > have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember
>  > > seeing the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will 
> survive
>  > > division into arbitrarily small intervals.
>  > >
>  > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  >
>  > Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows 
> just from the continuity of the physics. But it doesn't follow that 
> there is some experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it 
> might be that "seeing the flash" spans some time interval.
> 
> That's true, but it still allows that the process underpinning 
> consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think others on the list 
> have used "observer moment" to mean these arbitrarily small time slices, 
> even though you can't actually observe anything during one of them.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the "illusion" of 
their continuity may be provided by the continuity of their underpinning.  But 
I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete process as contemplated in the UD 
can provide that continuity.  It was my understanding that it assumed 
consciousness could be provided by a series of disjoint states.

Brent Meeker

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