Brent Meeker writes:> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > Brent Meeker writes:> > > >
> > > This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a> >
> > conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a> > > >
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that> > > >
5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not> > > >
much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring> > > >
hundreds of times over in different brains.> > > > >> > > > > Brent Meeker> >
> >> > > > I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the
order> > > > of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at
least > > this> > > > long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a
minimum duration> > > > for an observer moment, although the interval can be
divided up> > > > arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought
experiments) > > leaving> > > > the experience intact. However, this raises a
difficulty. Suppose you> > > > are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are
teleported to a > > distant> > > > place. Once you materialise, your neurons
will continue their > > processing> > > > of the red flash for another 1 msec
and at that point (i.e. 100 msec> > > > after being shown the flash) you will
perceive it. Next, suppose that> > > > you have no past but are created at the
teleportation receiving > > station> > > > from information *as if* you had
been shown a red flash 99 msec ago.> > > > Your newly-created brain will
process information for another 1 > > msec and> > > > then you should perceive
the red flash. However, in this case you have> > > > only been alive for 1
msec, and we can easily change the experiment to> > > > make this interval as
short as we want. Does this mean that an > > observer> > > > moment can
actually be instantaneous?> > > >> > > > Stathis Papaioannou> > >> > > This
example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian > > theatre in which
the brain does some processing *and then* you (the > > really real you)
perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in > > "Consciousness
Explained". The perception must be the processing and > > even if the flash is
very short and it's perceived duration is very > > short, the brain processes
producing that perception can be much longer.> > >> > > Brent Meeker> > > >
Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case where you > >
have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember > > seeing
the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will survive > > division
into arbitrarily small intervals.> > > > Stathis Papaioannou> > Assuming that
consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows just from the continuity
of the physics. But it doesn't follow that there is some experience
corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it might be that "seeing the
flash" spans some time interval.That's true, but it still allows that the
process underpinning consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think
others on the list have used "observer moment" to mean these arbitrarily small
time slices, even though you can't actually observe anything during one of
them.Stathis Papaioannou
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