On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + > > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its > > components; > > > Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior > entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from > looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, > but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not > genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it further. > or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton > > because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary > > and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom. > > In general this is not the case. You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there next to each other? > And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more > > impressive reduction. > > > But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom > can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a > part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all > decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you > have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron > will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing, > follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into > a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the > election and come back to y. Same with the UD, the object "atom of > hydrogen" is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person > plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say > an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of > self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's > psychology/theology. Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything? > As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D > > coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical > > circle or triangle. > > Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is > defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation > from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it > changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot > identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the > global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling > for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description. > People can look here for a cute knot table: > http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical reality. > Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that > > reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to > > reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not > > work... > > OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify > reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in > some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to > refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their > relation). > > I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal > Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version: > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm > then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is > anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many > practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but > this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the > many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if > they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if > comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter > emerges (logico-arithmetically, not "temporally") from mind and number. > > You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you > cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of > "relative bodies" to a mind. "relative bodies" are only defined by > infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies. > > (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus > for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to > already suspect that Aristotle was wrong). > > > > unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction. > > > Of course, but *that* would make any explanation a reductionism. The term is most commonly used in a pejorative sense against scientists, eg. "you can't reduce the mind to neurophysiology". Perhaps "physical reductionism" would be a better term for this criticism. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---