Bruno and Brent:
Are we back at the "Aris-total" i.e. the "sum" considered "more" than its 
(material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes more than 
what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. Qualia, functions, even 
out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item. 
It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say 
a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa. 

First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an 
observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in other 
observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if you have the 
means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its calculations).  Same 
with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in bunch. Reduced to a 2-D 
sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing such (macromolecules that is) and 
'studied'/applied  them. Of course none of the destruction-result carries the 
proper charactersitics of the original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' 
does exist.  
It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) -  not understood,  just 
regarded  as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has provided to THAT 
time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as the total and utter   
the Aristotelian maxim. 

One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics  from studying the so 
called parts we discovered so far. 
We can think only within our already acquired knowledge. 

John M

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 2:30 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 

  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  > Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
  >     On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  >      > You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
  >     electron +
  >      > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
  >      > components;
  >     Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
  >     entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
  >     looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
  >     but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
  >     genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
  >     Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
  >     somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
  >     there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
  >     explain it further.
  > That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
  > to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
  > Of course if the hidden factor is given by the "many worlds" or comp, 
  > then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then 
  > we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, 
  > but numbers.

  If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like 
Bohmian quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like 
statistical mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.

  >     You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
  >     don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
  >     and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
  >     next to each other?
  > Locally yes. 

  I'm not sure what you mean by "locally".  Since they have opposite charge 
they will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen 
atom state by emission of photons.

  Brent Meeker

  >In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
  > corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
  > open if such "physical state" acn ever be prepared, even locally.
  >     There is no sense to say
  >     an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of
  >     self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
  >     psychology/theology.
  >     Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
  > Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
  > what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
  >     Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
  >     defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
  >     from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
  >     changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
  >     identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
  >     global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
  >     for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
  >     People can look here for a cute knot table:
  >     I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the
  >     Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate
  >     physical reality.
  > I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. 

  A remark only a mathematician could make ;-)

  I think Bruno just means a knot is defined by the topology of its embedding 
in space - not by its material or its coordinates; as a triangle is defined by 
having three sides, not any particular size, orientation, or material.

  Brent Meeker


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11:27 AM

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