Le 15-mars-07, à 17:15, David Nyman a écrit :

> Yes, in that it makes sense to argue (from a 'contingentist'
> perspective) that the justification for 'primeness' (or indeed any
> other concept) derives ultimately from persistent aspects of
> contingent states of affairs (in this case a degree of persistence we
> abstract as 'necessity').  So from this perspective 17 is
> 'necessarily' prime, but this very 'necessity' is limited to the
> contingent framework that supports the conceptual one. In this view,
> positing 'platonic primeness' does no further work. This is not to
> take issue with Bruno's alternative numerical basis for contingency,
> but rather to see it as just that - an alternative, not a knock-down
> argument.


Please, don't take what I will say here as an authoritative argument. 
Giving the extreme newness, you have to understand this by yourself, 
and the UDA is really a construction which aimed at that. But my point 
is that once we assume the comp hyp in the cognitive science, then, the 
reversal between "matter" and "mind" is not an alternative, it is a 
necessity.
You can still believe in "primary matter" if you want to, but you just 
cannot use it to individuate neither mind/person, nor matter.
Of course, arithmetical truth as seen from inside is full of relative 
contingies, generally treated by a modal diamond (having an 
arithmetical interpretation).
For the UDA you need only a passive knowledge of Church thesis. For the 
lob interview you need more background in mathematical logic and in 
theoretical computer science.
And to believe it, I guess you have to know about the quantum, which is 
currently still more weird than anything I extract from comp (but that 
converges as it should).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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