Le 03-juin-07, à 03:43, Pete Carlton a écrit :
> If you really think consciousness > is epiphenomenal, you must endorse something like this: > "I know I'm conscious (for whatever reason). And, for some totally > unrelated reasons having nothing whatever to do with the fact that > I'm conscious, I also >say< that I'm conscious." This is not entirely convincing. Some epiphenomenalist would argue that the fact that I'm conscious and the fact that I utter that I am conscious are not causally related, but yet still related. This could make sense in case both phenomena AND epiphenomena are purely deterministic and/or just correlated. To be sure I don't believe in epiphenomenalism at all, and then the UDA shows it is inconsistent with the comp hyp. Even the so-called identity thesis (between for example pain and active neurons) is already inconsistent with the comp hyp. Pain can only be attached to a brain from outside in some relative way, in "reality" any enduring pain has to be associated to a continuum of consistent comp histories. The mind-body relation is not one-one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
