Le 03-juin-07, à 03:43, Pete Carlton a écrit :
> If you really think consciousness
> is epiphenomenal, you must endorse something like this:
> "I know I'm conscious (for whatever reason). And, for some totally
> unrelated reasons having nothing whatever to do with the fact that
> I'm conscious, I also >say< that I'm conscious."
This is not entirely convincing. Some epiphenomenalist would argue that
the fact that I'm conscious and the fact that I utter that I am
conscious are not causally related, but yet still related. This could
make sense in case both phenomena AND epiphenomena are purely
deterministic and/or just correlated.
To be sure I don't believe in epiphenomenalism at all, and then the UDA
shows it is inconsistent with the comp hyp. Even the so-called identity
thesis (between for example pain and active neurons) is already
inconsistent with the comp hyp. Pain can only be attached to a brain
from outside in some relative way, in "reality" any enduring pain has
to be associated to a continuum of consistent comp histories. The
mind-body relation is not one-one.
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