On 03/04/2008, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Dear List, > > I searched through the archive, this paper does not seem to have been > discussed. > > Quantity of Experience: Brain-Duplication and Degrees of Consciousness > > If two brains are in identical states, are there two numerically > distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? Two, I argue. But what > happens in intermediary cases? This paper looks in detail at this > question and suggests that there can be a fractional (non-integer) > number of qualitatively identical experiences. This has implications for > what it is to implement a computation and for Chalmer's Fading Qualia > thought experiment. [Minds and Machines, 2006, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 185-200] > > > http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf
The paper argues that a conscious program implemented on a computer built with probabilistic components would have fractional experiences. I think this is quite implausible. Firstly, there seems no good reason to claim that if all the components just happened to function normally on a particular run that this implementation would be phenomenally different to an implementation on a computer with normal components. Secondly, what could a fractional experience possibly be like? Bostrom makes it clear that this would not be equivalent to a less intense experience, but something quite different, that would not actually be noticed by the subject as a change from normal. This raises the possibility that my quantity of experience was decreased through some brain illness that afflicted me last night. But since I feel just the same today as I did yesterday, why should I care? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
