Kory, what you wrote makes in ALL probability perfect 'sense', but does it make sense (human - common that is) at all? Do we have a 'sense' of infinite? (It is a 'word' in the vocabulary). I don't see 'probability' either, as a definable concept. Anything can happen and in any sequence in your 'infinite' variability. The rest is "words only". Worst concept: statistical, depending on the chosen aspects we compare and on the boundaries of the observational domain. The 'infinite' in this sense washes out statistical and probability words. (I am sorry, if I read something: I try to put sense into it).
John M On Sat, Oct 25, 2008 at 10:38 PM, Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Oct 23, 5:34 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > If I am copied to two > > locations A and B, with each copy being identical, it seems reasonable > > to say that I have a 1/2 probability iof finding myself at A and a 1/2 > > probability of finding myself at B. But if I am copied perfectly at A > > and with half my memories (or personality, or whatever) to two > > locations B and C, what does that mean for the probabilities? > > That's a great question. I don't know the answer, but it seems to me > that it must affect the probabilities in some sense. If I'm copied to > two locations A and B, but something goes wrong with the B-copy, > causing it to end up as a non-conscious puddle of goo, it seems > reasonable to say that I have a 100% probability of finding myself at > A and a 0% chance of finding myself at B. However, if I'm copied to > two locations A and B over and over again, with A always being a > perfect copy and B being a successively less perfect copy until it's > just a puddle of goo, it *doesn't* seem reasonable to say that, at > some point, the removal of a single molecule causes the probabilities > to switch from 50/50 to 100/0. So even though I don't know how to > quantify the effect, I feel forced to conclude that the probabilities > gradually shift from 50/50 to 100/0 as the B-copy gets less and less > "similar" to me. > > Some will argue that it's not correct to talk about probabilities in > this context - that If I'm copied identically to two locations A and > B, it's not correct to speak in terms of probabilities of finding > myself in A or B. But even if that's true, it doesn't change my > conclusion that there must be a spectrum of cases. There's still > clearly something different about the cases when both A and B > represent copies of me, compared to the cases when B is a puddle of > goo and I am certainly going to find myself at A. It's impossible (for > me) to believe that the addition or removal of a single molecule could > cause one case to flip to the other, so I must believe that there's a > spectrum between the two cases. > > This conclusion has some bearing on the "white rabbit" problem. Many > people on this list think that the solution to the white rabbit > problem has something to do with "measure" - in other words, the > reason that I don't see talking white rabbits hopping through my room > right now is that in the ensemble of all my possible futures, the ones > in which talking white rabbits suddenly appear are less *numerous* > than those in which they don't. That theory has never seemed correct > to me, because I think I have an infinite number of possible futures > with talking white rabbits, and an infinite number without. The above > conclusion suggests an alternate theory based on *similarity* rather > than measure. > > -- Kory > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
