> The problem you raise is one of personal identity, and can be
> illustrated without invoking QTI. If I am copied 100 times so that
> copy #1 has 1% of my present memories, copy #2 has 2% of my present
> memories, and so on to copy #100 which has 100% of my present
> memories, which copy should I expect to end up as, and with what
> probability? What about if there are a million instantiations of copy
> #1 and one instantiation of the rest? What if there are 10^100^100
> instantiations of copies with 1/10^100 of my present memories - as
> there well might be?
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou

I agree with you that I don't think this issue is peculiar to MWI. I
like to adopt Tegmark's notions of the birds-eye view - looking down
at all the possible universes and the frog's eye view - looking from
the perspective of an observer in one particular universe. From the
frog's eye perspective, there clearly is an "I" (and personally
speaking I am especially wary of any argument which concludes with me
not existing) - or at the very least a strong illusion of an "I". So,
to answer your question, "you" branch off into all these other copies,
all of which were "you" before the copy and still are afterwards,
although with varying degrees of recall. This is the same as saying
that "I" was the same "I" as an instant ago, which at least helps
define a strand of "me-ness" in the total space.

And in the case of a skewed probability distribution, I don't see why
you wouldn't expect to end up in the most probable state (from the
frog pov). Maybe I'm missing something?
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