On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
> implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what > Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious > like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic, > or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in > arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the same > than mine: we don't need a material bottom. Yes. We may end up disagreeing about certain details (as any two philosophers will), but we seem to both hold the same basic position. > The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe > (your mathematical physicalism) is an open one. I'm a little bit confused by this, coming on the heels of your previous paragraph. Do you believe it's an open question whether or not "a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when directly implemented in arithmetic", or do you mean something different when you say "the existence of mathematical physical universe"? In any case, I take a strong stance on the former statement - I think we have enough reason right now to conclude that it's correct. > If it exists, we have > to explain how it wins the "measure of uncertainty" battle on all > other programs which reach also your mind computational state in the > universal deplyment. All right? (this follows from step seven). Do you mean that if "mathematical physicalism" is true, we need to offer a mathematical-physicalist solution to the "white rabbit problem"? I agree with that. And in fact, I don't claim to have a full solution to the white rabbit problem. However, I think the logical / philosophical arguments against the materialist's conception of "matter" are so strong, and the replacement of that conception with the concept of "mathematical facts-of-the-matter" is so fruitful, that the acceptance of mathematical physicalism is justified, even without a full solution to the white rabbit problem. >> "Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed >> to play for materialists." > > I would say "some mathematical facts". I see your point, although someday later I might want to defend the position that I don't really need the word "some". > For that reason I am > not sure you will appreciate the MGA, because you clearly seem to be > aware we don't need material stuff. I'm interested to learn how similar the MGA is to my own reasons for accepting what I'm calling "mathematical physicalism". It may turn out to be functionally identical to one of the arguments I've been using (in my head). Or it may be a complementary argument that I've never thought of. Or it may turn out that I don't find the argument persuasive, which may in turn indicate that what I'm calling mathematical physicalism isn't actually identical to your position. Or I might just think there's an easier or better way to get the same conclusion. In any case, I think it would be fruitful. -- Kory --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
