On 23 Nov 2008, at 22:09, Günther Greindl wrote:

> Bruno,
>> From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and
>> compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and
>> already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively.
> you could refute COMP (MEC) if it would contradict empirical QM, but  
> QM
> (and especially many worlds) is also compatible with MAT (and NOT  
> COMP).

I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically  
described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to  
comp), is the main motivation for the Many-World. Why not saying  
directly that the mind collapse the wave then?
I mean Everett is really SWE+COMP. (or weakening of COMP). I think  
that the wave collapse has been invented for both keeping the physical  
universe unique, but also making the observer beyond science.

> These would be Tegmark's Level I and II universes - infinite physical
> (or mathematical physicalist as defined by Kory) universes with matter
> permuting in all possible ways. If you then let consciousness  
> supervene
> on matter (but not in a COMP way (see MGA) - maybe because of local
> infinities or whatever) and with UNIFICATION you would also get a many
> worlds scenario (also in the sense that for a 1st person one would  
> have
> to look at the MAT-histories running through every OM)
> In your posts you do seem to have a preference for COMP (although you
> say you don't have a position ;-) but I think you definitely lean more
> to COMP than to MAT - are there reasons for this or is it only a
> personal predilection?

It is the same reason why someone in the dark can be searching its key  
only under the lamp. Elsewhere there is no chance he finds it. With  
comp we do have a theory of mind.
With MAT we haven't (except bibles, myth, etc.). There is no standard  
notion of mat histories, no satisfying notion of wholeness (like the  
deployment with comp). To have MAT correct, you have to accept not  
only actual infinities, but concrete actual infinities that you cannot  
approximate with Turing machine, nor with Turing Machine with oracle.  
You are a bit back to literal angels and fairies ...
Of course MAT + not COMP is consistent. Many catholic theological  
reading of Aristotelian based Matter theory propose similar idea  
making the soul "material" at some point. To my knowledge, Penrose is  
the only scientist which endorses this kind of views, allowing  
gravitation to play a role in the collapse. Its motivation from  
Godel's theorem are not correct, but its main "NON COMP or NOT MAT"  
starting intuition is valid with respect to MGA-UDA.

As I said many times, COMP is my favorite working *hypothesis*. It is  
my bread (or should be ...). I like it because it makes a part of  
philosophy or theology a science. We can doubt it, discuss it, and  
even refute it, with some chance, or confirme.
MAT has been a wonderful methodological assumption, but it has always  
being incoherent, or eliminativist on the mind.

> p.s.: I am looking forward to your further MGA posts (how far will  
> they
> go, you have hinted up to MGA 5?) and the ensuing discussion, I have
> very much enjoyed reading all this stuff.

Thanks. And so you believe that MAT+MEC makes Alice conscious through  
the projection of its brain movie! You really want me to show this is  
absurd. It is not so easy, and few people find this necessary, but I  
will do asap (MGA 3). MGA 4 is for those who make a special sort of  
objection which has not yet appeared, or those who will make a special  
objection to MGA 3, so ..., well I will do it because it puts more  
light on the meaning of the computational supervenience thesis. But  
MGA 4 is really ... Maudlin. And MGA 5 should be just a form of OCCAM  
razor, but I don't think this will be necessary, except perhaps for  
some last Advocate's devils and theoreticians of the Conspiracies :)

I will due this hopefully this week. Thanks for the patience.



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