Hi  Günther,

>> I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically
>> described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to  
>> comp),
> Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but "naked" infinite-dimensional
> Hilbert Space (the "everything" in QM)?

You put the finger on a problem I have with QM. I ill make a  
confession: I don't believe QM is "really" turing universal.
The universal quantum rotation does not generate any interesting  
I am open, say, to the idea that quantum universality needs  
measurement, and this could only exists internally. So the "naked"  
infinidimensional Hilbert space + the universal wave (rotation,  
unitary transformation) is a simpler ontology than arithmetical truth.
Yet, even on the vaccum, from inside its gives all the non linearities  
you need to build arithmetic ... and consciousness.

> With MAT we do not only
> concentrate on OMs (as with COMP) but on all states (which maybe don't
> have an OM)

I have no idea of what you try to say. With comp, we have an (non  
denombrable) infinity of computations, going through a (denombrable)  
infinity of states, and only few of them, I would say will have 1-OM  
role or 3-OM role. Even a fewer minority (a priori) will belongs to  
sharable computations (physical realities).

>> I mean Everett is really SWE+COMP.
> Ok I have not looked at it this way yet - how does COMP enter the
> picture automatically in the Everett interpretation?
> I am missing
> something here. Do you mean because all the solutions are computable?
> (but see objection above)

There are two ways COMP enter the picture in Everett or QM::
-When Everett showed the consistency of the intersubjective report in  
the case of many obervers doing experimentation together, he used  
machine-like observer. It has to assume the observer have capacities  
to distinguish 0, and 1, and have memories of result of experiments.  
In his long version paper everything is explained with some detail.
- The solution of SWE are computable. They does not go out of the F_i  
and W_i, SWE does not refute Church thesis.

>> With MAT we haven't (except bibles, myth, etc.). There is no standard
>> notion of mat histories,
> I agree - that is why I think COMP is a better guess than MAT -  
> although
> I still have some quibbles ...

Quibbles happens. Sure :)

>> deployment with comp). To have MAT correct, you have to accept not  
>> only
>> actual infinities, but concrete actual infinities that you cannot
>> approximate with Turing machine, nor with Turing Machine with oracle.
>> You are a bit back to literal angels and fairies ...
> Yes, we agree.
>> As I said many times, COMP is my favorite working *hypothesis*. It  
>> is my
> ...
>> MAT has been a wonderful methodological assumption, but it has always
>> being incoherent, or eliminativist on the mind.
> Ok. But what do you think of the following: Bertrand Russell's neutral
> monism (also Feigl and others) is an interesting metaphysical  
> "theory":
> one would have a basic "mind-stuff" - protoexperientials - which would
> follow the laws of comp.

Ontically, all we need are 0, the successor and successor's law,  
addition and multiplication.
With this you have already a sort of God which lost himself (agaian  
and again) in its creation ...

I have no problem  calling the comp ontic a neutral monism, if this is  
not used to eliminate again the first persons.

> It would not be a dualism, it would be mind-monism, but the "objects"
> being computed would not be OMs directly but some kind of basic
> mind-components - this idea is not new, in fact these objects would
> correspond to the "dharmas" of yogacara (and also Theravada Buddhism,
> but not so clearly there). (see
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
> Dharmas#Dharmas_in_Buddhist_phenomenology)

Imo, the Yogacara is excellent. I have already given the reference of  
the wonderful book by Wendy Donger O'Flaherty: "Dreams Illusion and  
Other Realities", which is good on that subject. There are many books  
comparing Plotinus and some Eastern conception of reality.

> One would lose the wonderful OM-COMP correspondence (which I think  
> is an
> important feature of your COMP)

OM, observer moment, is an expression, introduced in Bostrom. With  
comp, I have make an attempt to (re)define the OMs. The original first  
person PM of Bostrom can be recasted more or less in term of first  
person having proved some (sigma1) sentence. But this does not work  
well, you have to consider "fiber" on their extension, and so one (so  
it is a bit of a open problem which I bypass by the interview of the  
machine). 3-OM are more simple, they are just the sigma1 sentences.  
They correspond to the accessible states by the Universal Dovetailer.  
you can see the UD as a theorem prover proving all the true Sigma1  
sentences. (Of course the lobian machine generated through those  
proofs prove much more complex sentences than the UD. I will have to  
come back on this, cf "Searles Error" in this setting.

> and get some kind of "binding problem"
> again - how a unified consciousness results from the "dharmas"; but  
> one
> would be able to better explain how we have shareable histories (which
> is I think a _weak point_ of COMP if related directed to OMs - as has
> already been mentionend on the list, we can drift into solipsism with
> COMP quite easily (and I don't see why shareable histories of any  
> great
> measure should evolve)

All right. The point is that comp makes this entirely mathematically  
expressible. It is still an open problem if comp leads to solipsism,  
but all the evidences available today, are that it does not lead to  

>>> p.s.: I am looking forward to your further MGA posts (how far will  
>>> they
>>> go, you have hinted up to MGA 5?) and the ensuing discussion, I have
>>> very much enjoyed reading all this stuff.
>> Thanks. And so you believe that MAT+MEC makes Alice conscious through
>> the projection of its brain movie!
> Yes, if MAT+MEC is assumed, I would believe this. And I would not yet
> accept it as an "absurdity" and ruling out of MAT+MEC - although I  
> would
> see that it is beginning to get very strange *grin*

Yes. As a proof by reductio ad absurdo, it like
MEC+MAT => weird
MEC+MAT => more weird
MEC+MAT => even more weird
MEC+MAT => still even more weird
getting hopefully
MEC+MAT => false.

>> You really want me to show this is
>> absurd. It is not so easy, and few people find this necessary, but I
>> will do asap (MGA 3).
> Yup :-)

Ah! Gosh! You really want.  OK. asap.
I hope you are consistent, because it is depressing if at the end you  
tell me "OK MEC+MAT entails false", so what?  Did someone have a  
problem with "false"?

> And I would be interested what you think of the idea to let COMP  
> govern
> a "dharma"-level and not an OM-level directly.

I am asking myself if you are not doing a 1004 fallacy(*).  Hmmm...

But I let you a chance :)
Try to explain, like if it was to to a "layman",  the difference you  
make between "dharma-level" and "OM-level".  Which OM?
(remember that the superveneience thesis  is more conscience/  
"relative implementation of states", than conscience/implementation of  
states". The relativity will add the probability (or credibility) of  
context and histories.

(*)Like when Bruno said "about 1004 sheep" in "Sylivie and Bruno" by  
Lewis Carroll. This is for the new bees. 1004 fallacies are super  
frequent in the human sciences, but also sometimes in the exact  
science. It happens when you are more precise than it can be expected  
in a context. It confuses the reasoning, it can even kill the line of  
a reasoning, making it looking invalid when it is valid, by  
introducing irrelevant distinction. It is waste of time when not  
dishonest rethorical technic, notably in Politics, Health, etc)).

Must go. I have not the time to add spelling mistakes. (so sorry)



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