Hello Bruno, this is an answer for a mail a few weeks back, did not have the time up to now.
>With comp, we have an (non > denombrable) infinity of computations, going through a (denombrable) > infinity of states, and only few of them, I would say will have 1-OM > role or 3-OM role. Even a fewer minority (a priori) will belongs to > sharable computations (physical realities). Ok, so, in your view, some states code for 1-OM roles (qualia) and some states code for shareable views (quanta). Most states code for nothing. What is a 3-OM? Do you mean a 3rd-person view description of an OM? (for instance the "zombie" coding of a COMP state in a light-beam sent from Earth to Mars)? > expressible. It is still an open problem if comp leads to solipsism, but > all the evidences available today, are that it does not lead to solipsism. Which evidence? Is that one of your technical results? Which one? >> It would not be a dualism, it would be mind-monism, but the "objects" >> being computed would not be OMs directly but some kind of basic >> mind-components - this idea is not new, in fact these objects would >> correspond to the "dharmas" of yogacara (and also Theravada Buddhism, >> but not so clearly there). (see >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dharmas#Dharmas_in_Buddhist_phenomenology) >> >> One would lose the wonderful OM-COMP correspondence (which I think is an >> important feature of your COMP) >> and get some kind of "binding problem" >> again - how a unified consciousness results from the "dharmas"; but one >> would be able to better explain how we have shareable histories (which >> is I think a _weak point_ of COMP if related directed to OMs - as has >> already been mentionend on the list, we can drift into solipsism with >> COMP quite easily (and I don't see why shareable histories of any great >> measure should evolve) >> And I would be interested what you think of the idea to let COMP govern >> a "dharma"-level and not an OM-level directly. > > > I am asking myself if you are not doing a 1004 fallacy(*). > (*)Like when Bruno said "about 1004 sheep" in "Sylivie and Bruno" by > Lewis Carroll. <snip> It's not a 1004 fallacy, it is rather an attempt to recover some aspects of materialism. (See the Chalmers excerpt I have included below on type-F monism) But then, of course, it would succumb also to the MGA argument (that is, it does not go together with COMP). > Try to explain, like if it was to to a "layman", the difference you > make between "dharma-level" and "OM-level". Which OM? I guess I mean the difference between type-F monism and pure idealism (see again Chalmers text included below). Your view is a pure idealism, the type-f monism is a bit nearer to mainstream views (though still not widely held). > (remember that the superveneience thesis is more conscience/ "relative > implementation of states", than conscience/implementation of states". > The relativity will add the probability (or credibility) of context and > histories. Ah ok - so you mean that also with COMP and UDA there could be "raw feels" instantiated in Platonia (that would be dharma-level) - or some kind of protoexperential? Let me rephrase my question: with MAT, we have certain ideas (which might be wrong) on what mind could supervene on: on brains, that is, on certain organic chemical structures which exhibit high complexity and causal interaction. And this consciousness is a _unified_ experience (which also makes it a bit mysterious for MAT). With COMP, I am not sure on what consciousness would supervene. On a single step of a computation? On a turing machine state? On a number-theoretic relation? On a proof? And is the supervenient consciousness always tied to an integrated whole like a person, or, as I asked above, could also "raw feels" supervene on some parts of a computation which, relatively to others, constitute part of a computation on which a unified experience would supervene. (maybe that is what you mean with "conscience/ "relative implementation of states"? Is that also why you think that COMP is not solipsistic? For example, if consciousness directly supervenes on some form of computation, and physical appearances (SWE etc) have to be derived from the measure on outgoing computations, you must also be aware that all humans in your experience are "physical objects" - they would only _not_ be zombies if they are "fully computed" (such as your OM) - but how can you guarantee that with the idealistic interpretation that you have? With the "relative implementations"? I think that there is a bit of a difficulty hidden there. I am interested in your thoughts. Cheers, Günther P.S.: Below the excerpt from Chalmers. Some words on type-F monism and idealism. Consciousness and its Place in Nature http://consc.net/papers/nature.html David J. Chalmers [[Published in (S. Stich and F. Warfield, eds) Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, 2003), and in (D. Chalmers, ed) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford, 2002).]] Type-F Monism Type-F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions *[[Versions of type-F monism have been put forward by Russell 1926, Feigl 1958/1967, Maxwell 1979, Lockwood 1989, Chalmers 1996, Griffin 1998, Strawson 2000, and Stoljar 2001.]] snip This view holds the promise of integrating phenomenal and physical properties very tightly in the natural world. Here, nature consists of entities with intrinsic (proto)phenomenal qualities standing in causal relations within a spacetime manifold. Physics as we know it emerges from the relations between these entities, whereas consciousness as we know it emerges from their intrinsic nature. As a bonus, this view is perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and indeed with existing physical laws. The view can retain the structure of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this structure with an intrinsic nature. snip This view has elements in common with both materialism and dualism. From one perspective, it can be seen as a sort of materialism. If one holds that physical terms refer not to dispositional properties but the underlying intrinsic properties, then the protophenomenal properties can be seen as physical properties, thus preserving a sort of materialism. From another perspective, it can be seen as a sort of dualism. The view acknowledges phenomenal or protophenomenal properties as ontologically fundamental, and itretains an underlying duality between structural-dispositional properties (those directly characterized in physical theory) and intrinsic protophenomenal properties (those responsible for consciousness). One might suggest that while the view arguably fits the letter of materialism, it shares the spirit of antimaterialism. In its protophenomenal form, the view can be seen as a sort of neutral monism: there are underlying neutral properties X (the protophenomenal properties), such that the X properties are simultaneously responsible for constituting the physical domain (by their relations) and the phenomenal domain (by their collective intrinsic nature). In its phenomenal form, can be seen as a sort of idealism, such that mental properties constitute physical properties, although these need not be mental properties in the mind of an observer, and they may need to be supplemented by causal and spatiotemporal properties in addition. One could also characterize this form of the view as a sort of panpsychism, with phenomenal properties ubiquitous at the fundamental level. One could give the view in its most general form the name panprotopsychism, with either protophenomenal or phenomenal properties underlying all of physical reality. snip There is one sort of principled problem in the vicinity. Our phenomenology has a rich and specific structure: it is unified, bounded, differentiated into many different aspects, but with an underlying homogeneity to many of the aspects, and appears to have a single subject of experience. It is not easy to see how a distribution of a large number of individual microphysical systems, each with their own protophenomenal properties, could somehow add up to this rich and specific structure. Should one not expect something more like a disunified, jagged collection of phenomenal spikes? This is a version of what James called the combination problem for panpsychism, or what Stoljar (2001) calls the structural mismatch problem for the Russellian view (see also Foster 1991, pp. 119-30). To answer it, it seems that we need a much better understanding of the compositional principles of phenomenology: that is, the principles by which phenomenal properties can be composed or constituted from underlying phenomenal properties, or protophenomenal properties. We have a good understanding of the principles of physical composition, but no real understanding of the principles of phenomenal composition. This is an area that deserves much close attention: I think it is easily the most serious problem for the type-F monist view. At this point, it is an open question whether or not the problem can be solved. snip Overall, type-F monism promises a deeply integrated and elegant view of nature. No-one has yet developed any sort of detailed theory in this class, and it is not yet clear whether such a theory can be developed. But at the same time, there appear to be no strong reasons to reject the view. As such, type-F monism is likely to provide fertile grounds for further investigation, and it may ultimately provide the best integration of the physical and the phenomenal within the natural world. snip Second, some nonmaterialists are idealists (in a Berkeleyan sense), holding that the physical world is itself constituted by the conscious states of an observing agent. We might call this view type-I monism. It shares with type-F monism the property that phenomenal states play a role in constituting physical reality, but on the type-I view this happens in a very different way: not by having separate "microscopic" phenomenal states underlying each physical state, but rather by having physical states constituted holistically by a "macroscopic" phenomenal mind. This view seems to be non-naturalistic in a much deeper sense than any of the views above, and in particular seems to suffer from an absence of causal or explanatory closure in nature: once the natural explanation in terms of the external world is removed, highly complex regularities among phenomenal states have to be taken as unexplained in terms of simpler principles. But again, this sort of view should at least be acknowledged. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
