On 25 Dec 2008, at 22:01, Günther Greindl wrote:

> Hello Bruno,
> this is an answer for a mail a few weeks back, did not have the time  
> up
> to now.
>> With comp, we have an (non
>> denombrable) infinity of computations, going through a (denombrable)
>> infinity of states, and only few of them, I would say will have 1-OM
>> role or 3-OM role. Even a fewer minority (a priori) will belongs to
>> sharable computations (physical realities).
> Ok, so, in your view, some states code for 1-OM roles (qualia) and  
> some
> states code for shareable views (quanta).

Actually the states are the same. It is the same states which codes  
for the 1-OM, and the 3-OM, but they are interpreted differently by  
the universal machine (the one which plays the role of the observer,  
as opposed to the one which could play the role of the most probable  
local universe).

Platonia = Arithmetical truth, all the rest is "arithmetical truth" as  
accessed and interpreted by internal universal system, themselves  
belonging to arithmetical truth.

We will have 1-OM = 3-OM, and a proof that the machine cannot believe  
that "1-OM = 3-OM", and that is why 1-OM and 3-OM will, from the point  
of view of the machine, obey different logic.

> Most states code for nothing.

I cannot say, because it is ambiguous.

> What is a 3-OM? Do you mean a 3rd-person view description of an OM?
> (for instance the "zombie" coding of a COMP state in a light-beam sent
> from Earth to Mars)?

It is almost that, OK. (it more the immaterial information than the  
physical implementation of the description).

>> expressible. It is still an open problem if comp leads to  
>> solipsism, but
>> all the evidences available today, are that it does not lead to  
>> solipsism.
> Which evidence? Is that one of your technical results? Which one?

It is the fact that if we are able to share a physical world, we have  
to share a first person indeterminacy, and thus we have to share a  
logic of qualia (a quantum logic as the one given by the fourth and  
five arithmetical hypostases), and this is confirmed by QM, where we  
share first person (plural) indeterminacies. With QM the whole planet  
is polyplicated all the times.

>>> It would not be a dualism, it would be mind-monism, but the  
>>> "objects"
>>> being computed would not be OMs directly but some kind of basic
>>> mind-components - this idea is not new, in fact these objects would
>>> correspond to the "dharmas" of yogacara (and also Theravada  
>>> Buddhism,
>>> but not so clearly there). (see
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dharmas#Dharmas_in_Buddhist_phenomenology)
>>> One would lose the wonderful OM-COMP correspondence (which I think  
>>> is an
>>> important feature of your COMP)
>>> and get some kind of "binding problem"
>>> again - how a unified consciousness results from the "dharmas";  
>>> but one
>>> would be able to better explain how we have shareable histories  
>>> (which
>>> is I think a _weak point_ of COMP if related directed to OMs - as  
>>> has
>>> already been mentionend on the list, we can drift into solipsism  
>>> with
>>> COMP quite easily (and I don't see why shareable histories of any  
>>> great
>>> measure should evolve)
>>> And I would be interested what you think of the idea to let COMP  
>>> govern
>>> a "dharma"-level and not an OM-level directly.
>> I am asking myself if you are not doing a 1004 fallacy(*).
>> (*)Like when Bruno said "about 1004 sheep" in "Sylivie and Bruno" by
>> Lewis Carroll.
> <snip>
> It's not a 1004 fallacy, it is rather an attempt to recover some  
> aspects
> of materialism. (See the Chalmers excerpt I have included below on
> type-F monism)
> But then, of course, it would succumb also to the MGA argument (that  
> is,
> it does not go together with COMP).


>> Try to explain, like if it was to to a "layman",  the difference you
>> make between "dharma-level" and "OM-level".  Which OM?
> I guess I mean the difference between type-F monism and pure idealism
> (see again Chalmers text included below). Your view is a pure  
> idealism,
> the type-f monism is a bit nearer to mainstream views (though still  
> not
> widely held).

I have no view. Only an argument or even a theorem which asserts that  
IF digital mechanism is correct, then "pure idealism" is not an  
option, it is a necessary consequence (with the usual weak Occam razor).
I don't say "I don't need matter", I am saying that "I cannot use  
matter for explaining consciousness". It is quite different.

>> (remember that the superveneience thesis  is more conscience/  
>> "relative
>> implementation of states", than conscience/implementation of states".
>> The relativity will add the probability (or credibility) of context  
>> and
>> histories.
> Ah ok - so you mean that also with COMP and UDA there could be "raw
> feels" instantiated in Platonia (that would be dharma-level) - or some
> kind of protoexperential?

Yes of course. It is full experiential (not protoexperential).  
"platonia" (arithmetical truth) is all there is, with occam. So  
consciousness is a internal feature of platonia.
Note that we could still eliminate consciousness if we want, and, like  
positivist, to contend ourself with the study of the many stable  
discourse of the machines living and developing themselves relatively  
in Platonia. But given that those numbers keep pretending that they  
are not zombie, that there is something they cannot doubt, yet cannot  
defined, well,  given that they are both correct (as a mathematician I  
study only those which are correct, the "simple" Lobian machines), and  
given that they are asserting that they are not zombies, why should I  
distinguish them from myself?
For making this "rigorous" I have to interpret "consciousness" by a  
bet on something in between truth and consistency, which, remarkably  
enough, is what you get once you interpret literally Theatetus' notion  
of knowledge (Bp & p) in arithmetic (p = any arithmetical definition,  
and Bp is the usual Gödel Bew('p').  Consciousness = <O>p  =  
Consistent p or p.

> Let me rephrase my question: with MAT, we have certain ideas (which
> might be wrong) on what mind could supervene on: on brains, that is,  
> on
> certain organic chemical structures which exhibit high complexity and
> causal interaction.

Yes. It is the physical supervenience thesis. It is even the one which  
makes us saying "yes" to the doctor, at the start.  It remains true  
throughout the whole reasoning if you keep the sense of "physical"  
evolving thoughout the whole reasoning.  For many, at the beginning  
(step 1) "physical" means the real material brain and the real  
material computer which replaced it, the details of which being left  
to the doctor; and at the end of the reasoning "physical" means the  
third plural representation of myself which enhanced (makes higher the  
probabilities) my first person experience in my normal (most probable)  
computational histories.

> And this consciousness is a _unified_ experience
> (which also makes it a bit mysterious for MAT).

Consciousness is the attribute of persons betting on their own  
consistency, which will be equivalent in their beliefs in a reality  
sustaining themselves.

Consciousness is an undivisible one. It is first personal. That first  
person is not divisible, and not first personal duplicable. In comp,  
like in Everett, no one can feel the "split". Consciousness is lived  
as a unified experience because the first person is intrinsically one.

You could perhaps read the neurophysiologist Penfield for the discover  
that no physical brain pertubation can divide the "self-feeling",  
despite the fact that again, we can multiply it (apparently, Sperry  
experience for example: hard to get definite conclusion of course ...).
PENFIELD W., 1975, The Mystery of the Mind, Princeton University  
Press, New Jersey.

> With COMP, I am not sure on what consciousness would supervene. On a
> single step of a computation? On a turing machine state? On a
> number-theoretic relation? On a proof?

On all that!  More precisely, the consciousness of the relative  
universal machine supervenes on all possible relative state of all  
universal machines. Any local and relative particularisation of that  
universal machine differentiates it into particular experience  
supervening on all number theoretical relations (at once) occuring or  
defined by the universal deployment (or Sigma_1 Truth).
But we can interview, obviously, only the chatty universal machine  
which can talk about themselves and the bet they made on realities,  
that is why I interview "all" Lobian machine in Platonia (all at once,  
thanks to Gödel, Löb, Solovay).

Sometimes I think I should insist that Platonia is very different  
before and after Godel. Assuming comp "we" are in Platonia, and "we"  
put the mess in it ("we" the universal machine). The regular solids  
and clean truth remains, but what is "new" is the irregular solids and  
the *very* (but relative) complex phenomena. Now we know that there  
can be typhoons, tornados and tsunami in Platonia, and we have to  
learn the wisdom of insecurity (cf Alan Watts).

> And is the supervenient consciousness always tied to an integrated  
> whole
> like a person,

Yes. Could be a planaria or a drosophila or any universal machine (or  
sub-universal machine, gosh, there are nuances ...).

> or, as I asked above, could also "raw feels" supervene on
> some parts of a computation which, relatively to others, constitute  
> part
> of a computation on which a unified experience would supervene. (maybe
> that is what you mean with "conscience/ "relative implementation of  
> states"?

I would say no. Consciousness supervenes on the locally relevant  
bundle of number theoretical relations. The measure depends on some  
equivalence relation. You have to take account of all computations (in  
Platonia) going through a state. Somehow consciousness supervene  
vacuously on any particular implementation. The implementation makes  
the particular experience relatively stable to you, and thus capable  
of manifesting itself relatively to you in your normal histories.

> Is that also why you think that COMP is not solipsistic? For  
> example, if
> consciousness directly supervenes on some form of computation, and
> physical appearances (SWE etc) have to be derived from the measure on
> outgoing computations, you must also be aware that all humans in your
> experience are "physical objects" - they would only _not_ be zombies  
> if
> they are "fully computed" (such as your OM) - but how can you  
> guarantee
> that with the idealistic interpretation that you have? With the
> "relative implementations"?

Honestly I cannot guarantee that, now.

Perhaps you still miss the point. I have no theory nor interpretation.  
I am just saying that if you say yes to the doctor, then there is no  
room for a notion of primarily existing matter.

It is not that we don't need any more the notion of matter, it is that  
we can no more invoke it to singularize the experience of the mind. We  
have to redefine it by a relative measure on consistent extensions,  
and this in a particular precise way, and this makes mechanism testable.

Now the discovery of the arithmetical hypostases makes Everett  
confirming the most startling consequence of comp: the fact that we  
are polyplicated all together. Without Everett confirmation, I would  
have believed that comp leads to solipsism, and abandon it.

> I think that there is a bit of a difficulty hidden there.
> I am interested in your thoughts.

Please, I am not the one hiding the difficulties. I use comp because  
it makes the difficulties much more transparent, and mathematically  
expressible. With MEC, the mind theory is relatively easy (= the study  
of what numbers can say about themselves and their realities), but the  
theory of matter get far more complex: the measure on all relative  
consistent continuations for universal machine. This is mainly a gate  
to a sequence of precise mathematical open problems. My point is that  
we have to solve them to get the "real TOE", once we say yes to the  

If COMP leads to solipsism in the sense that only Bruno Marchal  
exists, then I will abandon comp.
If COMP leads to solipsism in the sense that only the Universal  
Machine exists, then it will depends on what that could mean.

I am not the one proposing a theory, I am the one showing that a  
theory (believed by many) leads to precise and intersting  
difficulties, and also gives another view on "reality" (not so "other"  
given that it is in the line of Plato).



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