On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
> I'm with Mike and Brent.
> Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
> violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
> can't go out of the system.
See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and
thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the
computation differs. It is like being duplicated in two identical
rooms. This change the (local and relative) measure, because if you
open the "box" in the room you will find zero or one, but not both.
> And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical
> computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I
> gather you assume).
Not if you distinguish first person and third person. It is the third
person computations which gives the local relative probabilities, but
yes the stream of consciousness (first person) is the same. This lead
to a vocabulary problem like chosing the word "bifurcation" or
"differentiation" for computation which, at some point *becomes*
Consciousness is unique and immaterial. As such it resides in
"Platonia". Life, that is embedding in relative computaional histories
is what makes consciousness differentiate.
> Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting
> the same OM.
You are right, but different computations can be understood locally
and globally. The "computation of me up to Washington is different of
the computation of me up to Moscow, even when I am still in Brussels.
It is contained in the Y = II idea. Note that the same "vocabulary"
problem occurs with Quantum Physics.
Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for
computation. But we can already derive what can count as different
computations if we want those measure question making sense.
> Michael Rosefield wrote:
>> I agree. They are both pointers to the same abstract computation.
>> - Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
>> - Mmm.
>> - That was me... and six other guys.
>> 2009/2/10 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>> 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah <jackmal...@yahoo.com
>>>>>> This sort of talk about "random sampling" and "luck" is
>>>>>> and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective
>>>>>> into the four categories I did in the paper.
>>>>>> If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI
>>>>>> sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you
>>>>>> define "you", "you" will either be all of them, or "you" are just
>>>>>> an observer-moment and can consider them to be "other people".
>>>>>> Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring
>>>>>> Measure for decision making.
>>>>> It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal
>> identity. It
>>>>> is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek
>>>>> Parfit calls the "reductionist" theory of personal identity.
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