Bruno, - again the bartender...
*
Initial remark:
I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I
find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are
in my opinion *thought - conditions* to make one's theory workable and so
they are  conditioned by the circumstances.
*
What I try to add is the *'mind-body' problem*. While I have no definition
for *"mind",* we 'all' think to know what it means: *a non-material
mentality* which encompasses the tool's (brain(function)) *genetic
built differences* - i.e. enhanced  or reduced ease of connectivity-building
in select topical domains - plus the *sum of previous experience* helping
one's personal interpretation (and maybe more) including one's faith in a
"soul" as well, while the* 'body'* is the formulation of a* **figment* in
the 'physical world' upon phenomena that are (mis/poorly) understood when
received and *both *are parts of the *complexity of us*.
I cannot figure a 'separation' of substantial parts of a complexity without
destruction of the complexity in its entirety, so a "transport" can be only
the entire complexity - or none.
Aristotle had it easy with his simple cognitive level of the 'physical
world' so there was an easy possibility of thinking separately about the
physical body and the rest of it not fitting into such.

In brief: *I se no 'mind-body' problem*, only when we try the ancient (I may
say: obsolete) ways of separating the *'physical world figment'* from the
total (complexity).
*
((you promised an explanatory post to my askings - I am in a hurry to write
down these remarks, because MAYBE after your explanations these would not
make sense<G>))

John M

On Sun, Mar 8, 2009 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> > The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
> > successors
> > (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
> > numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
> > is
> > consistent).
>
> Hmmm.... (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build
> to much scenario from you say here).
>
> Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is
> essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; "did you see
> that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more
> complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only
> to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but
> we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if
> there exists any, from that theory of mind.
>
> But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we
> continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer
> science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or
> combinators ...). here there are the "bombs" (creative bomb) of Post
> Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of "universal machine",
> and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability
> predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable
> properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay.
> Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian
> Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its
> correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine.
>
> The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the
> very rare "absolute" notion. It makes "computable" an absolute notion.
> Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content,
> in the digital realm, of Church Thesis.
> Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of
> provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth
> concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory
> or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with
> chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano
> Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible
> cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster
> portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture;
> like us, obviously today at least.
> >
> >
> >
> >> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor
> >> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be
> >> other
> >> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's
> >> state, a
> >> continuum of successor states exists.
> >
> > This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine
> > states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is
> > not
> > at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?
> >
> > After all, there are halting computations.
>
> By step seven.
> A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes
> it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which
> univerrsal machine we are, nor really which universal machine supports
> us. The UD generates your state S again, and again, and again an
> infinity of time (UD-step time) in many similar and less similar
> computational histories. The first person expectations have to be
> defined (by UDA(1-6) on *all* computational histories. If only due to
> those stupid histories dovetailing on the reals while generating your
> state S, makes the cardinal of the set of all (infinite) computational
> histories going through that state S a continuum.
>
> That the "UDA" informal view.
>
> In AUDA, the first person view is given by the conjunction of
> provability with truth. We lose kripke accessibility, but we get a
> richer topology, close to histories with continuous angles in between;
> but it is heavily technical. Each hypostases has its own mathematics.
>
> Surely more later,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>

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