Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hello Quentin,
> Le 30-mars-09, à 20:03, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
>> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>>>> Hi Kelly, and others,
>>>>> Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It usually
>>>>> last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with you, I know
>>>>> only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy you
>>>>> your experience interesting. You can consult and discuss your
>>>>> experience, and those of others here:
>>>>> Now the real question is, does that experience helped in
>>>>> providing, for
>>>>> example, an answer to my last remark to Quentin?
>>>>> I quote the question again. It is important concerning
>>>>> comp-immortality, and eventually how to derive physics from computer
>>>>> I do think such a question is difficult, and show the weakness in
>>>>> identifying the self with personal memories, and this justifies the
>>>>> necessity of the AUDA move, I think.
>>>>> Of course, if you enjoy dream-state-like, you can enjoy Salvia without
>>>>> troubling yourself with hard metaphysical questions. Yet I would be
>>>>> interesting if Quentin or Stathis, or anyone, could acknowledge a
>>>>> conceptual difficulty here.
>>>>> I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability "now",
>>>>> that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24 december
>>>>> 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March 2009) and
>>>>> reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March 2009, say)?
>>>>> The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in
>>>>> Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20 Augustus 2009
>>>>> you (the you in Washington) suffered a "total amnesia". And then,
>>>>> "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through adequate
>>>>> medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of yous did
>>>>> move from W or M).
>>>> Well I think all of this depends on the fact that your memories
>>>> "come back". If it doesn't then I will not be in washington, cqfd.
>>> What if half of your memory come back?
>> Well, it would be a half me continuation... :-)
> Hmm... ":-)" indeed.
>> And in the setup explained here... Plain me continuation would be the
>> one in Moscow... and Half me would be in washington.
> I am not sure this makes sense.
>> If me now could meet both of me plain and half ... I would certainly
>> identify current me to be plain me.
> You can care about him more, but you cannot identify yourself with, in
> the usual first person way.
> It is some another person, from your 1-point of view.
>> While I would care for half me, I care less of him than plain me.
>> But if no memories at all are left I wouldn't identify him as myself
>> like I don't identify you (nor any future you) as myself.
> You could be astonished. I know you don't like the idea.
>>>> What you're talking about salvia (loosing your personnal identity
>>>> during the experience) is only correct because you have memories of
>>>> it (salvia experience) on your current self which knows he is
>>>> Bruno. If you had no memories of it then it makes no sense to say
>>>> you did loose your "identity".
>>> Yes, but retrospectively, I can assert that I remain conscious,
>>> despite the loss of identity. So, why should we not take such
>>> "computational ontinuations" into account, in the immortality
>>> question, and in the hunt of 1-white rabbits? This is certainly not
>>> clear for me.
>> We should take in account those continuation where the memory loss is
> This can make sense. We already know that the "probabilities" can
> "retro-propagate". I remain a bit skeptical, because I feel like I am
> the owner of memories, not like I am those memories.
> The easiest self-duplication experiences show that we are not our bodies.
Yet they assume we are our bodies; otherwise duplicating the body
wouldn't duplicate the self. Suppose the duplication were performed
this way. You get into a sensory deprivation tank and after and hour or
so you are duplicated, along with the tank. Because you are still in
the tank you are not having any external perceptions. Would there be
two of you? Or would there only be two when one or both of you exited
> Thought experiment with amnesia, which I have banned form my theses
> and publications, shows that we neither our memories. I can understand
> that some would conclude we are nothing, but I think we keep remaining
> the "universal person", the one described by the third hypostases.
> That entity can be conscious, even if out of time and space, indeed
> AUDA shows that it is the builder of time and space. I thought enough
> time has to be created in order for consciousness to operate, and it
> is here that salivia divinorum seems to force me to revise that
> opinion. (I am amazed, and I am sure of nothing, here. I push to the
> limit). This would answer a question raised a long time ago on the
> list: how many person are they. Answer: possibly one.
>> not the one where I become you. The contrary is like the believer in
>> reincarnation, if you don't remember your past live then it is the
>> same as you didn't have any pas live and on a personal and selfish
>> view, totally useless to the current live. What's the point to
>> survive/reincarnate if there is nothing left of you..
> Loosing memories does not mean that nothing is left of you. Especially
> if you keep consciousness. You can forget your past identity, and
> still keep anything for having a personal identity. In particular the
> self-referential motor. In the salvia experience, I belong to those
> who does not want really to come back. Sometimes memories ... well, I
> don't need them all. It is useful locally, when you are young, but it
> can be heavy too, especially when you are older. It is important for
> history learning, and for not repeating errors, but it is like a
> ladder, at some point it can be better to forget, and jump to
> something else.
> Also, we forget all the time, many things. Do I die because I forget
> some dreams this night?
>> I don't call that surviving... I don't care if my body doesn't
>> biologically survive... I care that *I* (my
>> mind/memories/experiences) survive.
> The problem is not what about we care, but how to compute the first
> person indeterminacy in extreme situation. According to you, the comp
> immortality or the quantum immortality makes sense only for those
> continuations which keep all or most the memories. I think, currently
> and without any certainty, that the notion of relative "normal worlds"
> or relative "normal continuations will be prevalent, possibly against
> our wishes.
> To take a not so funny example, suppose someone get Alzheimer, and
> that at some time t, he forget most of his life events. Would you say
> that from his own point of view, he does not feel sick and keep its
> memory thanks to the continuations where rare (in Everett sense) lucky
> quantum events prevent his disease to develop?
I think we need to distinguish different stages of memory. You can
certainly be yourself without long-term memories: memories of you
childhood or even of yesterday. Not forming any short term, ~minutes,
memories produces confusion and difficulty in functioning but one can
still recognize the personality. My father had Alzheimer's and that's
how he was; although in the early stages of Alzheimer's the person tends
to remember with clarity events of their youth. But there is also very
short term, ~second, memory which allows us to perceive the continuity
of music and our surroundings. Without that, I think it would be hard
to even be conscious.
>>>> As for conscious dream... I don't think you *do* know you're
>>>> conscious while dreaming, but you do know it after the dreaming
>>> John Mikes seems to think so too, but here I certainly disagree.
>>> Lucid dreamer, who are verifiably in the paradoxical state of dream
>>> (through EEG) , can communicate with the observer in the lab,
>>> through eyes moves or through extremity of fingers (which are not
>> Well do they ? Does the dreamer remember interacting with the
>> observer (the real one) ? I know that outside sound/temperature/...
>> act on the dream, just because while dreaming we are never truly and
>> completly disconnected from the outside... But it says nothing about
>> the consciousness of the dreamer. The dreamer remember after being
>> awake he was somehow conscious, but was he really ? I do remember
>> conscious dream (or so I called) still do not really believe I was in
>> the sense I was now.
>> They have made all the usual experience (singing, computing,
>> walking, running in the dream) and they have discover it generate the
>> same activity in the dream than in the waking life. The experience of
>> Laberge and Dement have definitely convinced me that the hypothesis
>> that we are unconscious during dream is badly founded.
>>> Consciousness should not be confused with awakeness.
>> Could you give me some links about those experiences ?
> I have the photocopies of the original papers, and some selected
> papers book. You will find the references in the chapter 3.1 of
> "Conscience et Mécanisme" (which is the chapter on "dreams, brains and
> You could also google on "laberge dement lucid", let us see:
> This relates some of the experiences I was mentioning.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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