Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>     On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>     Hi,
>>     2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
>>     <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>         Hi Kelly, and others,
>>         Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It
>>         usually
>>         last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with
>>         you, I know
>>         only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy
>>         you found
>>         your experience interesting. You can consult and discuss your
>>         experience, and those of others here:
>>         http://www.entheogen.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=135
>>         Now the real question is, does that experience helped in
>>         providing, for
>>         example, an answer to my last remark to Quentin?
>>         I quote the question again. It is important concerning
>>         comp-immortality, and eventually how to derive physics from
>>         computer
>>         science.
>>         I do think such a question is difficult, and show the weakness in
>>         identifying the self with personal memories, and this
>>         justifies the
>>         necessity of the AUDA move, I think.
>>         Of course, if you enjoy dream-state-like, you can enjoy
>>         Salvia without
>>         troubling yourself with hard metaphysical questions. Yet I
>>         would be
>>         interesting if Quentin or Stathis, or anyone, could acknowledge a
>>         conceptual difficulty here.
>>         <<Hmmm...
>>         I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability
>>         "now",
>>         that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24
>>         december
>>         2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March
>>         2009) and
>>         reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March
>>         2009, say)?
>>         The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in
>>         Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20
>>         Augustus 2009
>>         you (the you in Washington) suffered a  "total amnesia".  And
>>         then,
>>         "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through
>>         adequate
>>         medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of
>>         yous did
>>         move from W or M).
>>     Well I think all of this depends on the fact that your memories
>>     "come back". If it doesn't then I will not be in washington, cqfd.
>     What if half of your memory come back?
> Well, it would be a half me continuation... :-)
> And in the setup explained here... Plain me continuation would be the 
> one in Moscow... and Half me would be in washington. If me now could 
> meet both of me plain and half ... I would certainly identify current 
> me to be plain me. While I would care for half me, I care less of him 
> than plain me. But if no memories at all are left I wouldn't identify 
> him as myself like I don't identify you (nor any future you) as myself.
>>     What you're talking about salvia (loosing your personnal identity
>>     during the experience) is only correct because you have memories
>>     of it (salvia experience) on your current self which knows he is
>>     Bruno. If you had no memories of it then it makes no sense to say
>>     you did loose your "identity".
>     Yes, but retrospectively, I can assert that I remain conscious,
>     despite the loss of identity. So, why should we not take such
>     "computational ontinuations" into account, in the immortality
>     question, and in the hunt of 1-white rabbits? This is certainly
>     not clear for me.
> We should take in account those continuation where the memory loss is 
> temporary... not the one where I become you. The contrary is like the 
> believer in reincarnation, if you don't remember your past live then 
> it is the same as you didn't have any pas live and on a personal and 
> selfish view, totally useless to the current live. What's the point to 
> survive/reincarnate if there is nothing left of you.. I don't call 
> that surviving... I don't care if my body doesn't biologically 
> survive... I care that *I* (my mind/memories/experiences) survive.
>>     As for conscious dream... I don't think you *do* know you're
>>     conscious while dreaming, but you do know it after the dreaming
>>     experience.
>     John Mikes seems to think so too, but here I certainly disagree.
>     Lucid dreamer, who are verifiably in the paradoxical state of
>     dream (through EEG) , can communicate with the observer in the
>     lab, through eyes moves or through extremity of fingers (which are
>     not paralysed).
> Well do they ? Does the dreamer remember interacting with the observer 
> (the real one) ? I know that outside sound/temperature/... act on the 
> dream, just because while dreaming we are never truly and completly 
> disconnected from the outside... But it says nothing about the 
> consciousness of the dreamer. The dreamer remember after being awake 
> he was somehow conscious, but was he really ? I do remember conscious 
> dream (or so I called) still do not really believe I was in the sense 
> I was now.
>     They have made all the usual experience (singing, computing,
>     walking, running in the dream) and they have discover it generate
>     the same activity in the dream than in the waking life. The
>     experience of Laberge and Dement have definitely convinced me that
>     the hypothesis that we are unconscious during dream is badly founded. 
>     Consciousness should not be confused with awakeness.

Of course being asleep, whether dreaming or not, is not being 
unconscious.  I sleep peacefully through my clock chiming, my wife 
getting up and coming back to bed; but I awake instantly if my name is 
whispered or there is a strange noise in the kitchen.


> Could you give me some links about those experiences ?
> Thank you,
> Quentin
> -- 
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
> >

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