Hi Bruno and Members,
The comment that is made below seems to only involve a single consciousness
and an exterior "reality". Could we not recover a very similar situation if we
consider the 1-PoV and 3-PoV relation to hold to some degree over a multitude
of consciouness (plurality). In the plurality case, the "objective doubtful but
sharable possible reality" would be composed of a large intersection of sorts
of 3-PoV aspects that can be recognized by or mapped to a statistical or
generic notion of a 1-PoV. No?
----- Original Message -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 1:33 PM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its consciousness, I
think, although it can doubt everything else it can be conscious *about*.
It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes systematic
doubting procedure (this fit well with the self-reference logics, taking
consciousness as consistency).
Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake doubts)
We live on the overlap of a subjective un-sharable certainty (the basic first
person knowledge) and an objective doubtful but sharable possible reality (the
third person belief).
To keep 3-comp, and to abandon consciousness *is* the correct materialist
step, indeed. But you cannot keep 1-comp(*) then, because it is defined
by reference to consciousness. When you say "yes" to the doctor, we assume
the "yes" is related to the belief that you will survive. This means you
believe that you will not loose consciousness, not become a zombie, nor will
you loose (by assumption) your own consciousness, by becoming someone else you
can't identify with.
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