Hi Bruno and Members,

    The comment that is made below seems to only involve a single consciousness 
and an exterior "reality". Could we not recover a very similar situation if we 
consider the 1-PoV and 3-PoV relation to hold to some degree over a multitude 
of consciouness (plurality). In the plurality case, the "objective doubtful but 
sharable possible reality" would be composed of a large intersection of sorts 
of 3-PoV aspects that can be recognized by or mapped to a statistical or 
generic notion of a 1-PoV. No?


  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 1:33 PM
  Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?


  Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its consciousness, I 
think, although it can doubt everything else it can be conscious *about*.
  It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes systematic 
doubting procedure (this fit well with the self-reference logics, taking 
consciousness as consistency).

  Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake doubts)

  We live on the overlap of a subjective un-sharable certainty (the basic first 
person knowledge) and an objective doubtful but sharable possible reality (the 
third person belief).

  To keep 3-comp, and to abandon consciousness *is* the correct materialist 
step, indeed. But you cannot keep 1-comp(*) then, because it is defined
  by reference to consciousness. When you say "yes" to the doctor, we assume 
the "yes" is related to the belief that you will survive. This means you 
believe that you will not loose consciousness, not become a zombie, nor will 
you loose (by assumption) your own consciousness, by becoming someone else you 
can't identify with.
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