On 05 May 2009, at 20:13, Stephen Paul King wrote:

> Hi Bruno and Members,
>     The comment that is made below seems to only involve a single  
> consciousness and an exterior "reality". Could we not recover a very  
> similar situation if we consider the 1-PoV and 3-PoV relation to  
> hold to some degree over a multitude of consciouness (plurality). In  
> the plurality case, the "objective doubtful but sharable possible  
> reality" would be composed of a large intersection of sorts of 3-PoV  
> aspects that can be recognized by or mapped to a statistical or  
> generic notion of a 1-PoV. No?

Yes. May be. Why? You need something like that for the first person  
plural, but you have to extract it in some precise way for solving the  
UD measure problem. You could elaborate perhaps.


> From: Bruno Marchal
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 1:33 PM
> Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
> snip
> Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its  
> consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can  
> be conscious *about*.
> It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes  
> systematic doubting procedure (this fit well with the self-reference  
> logics, taking consciousness as consistency).
> Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake  
> doubts)
> We live on the overlap of a subjective un-sharable certainty (the  
> basic first person knowledge) and an objective doubtful but sharable  
> possible reality (the third person belief).
> To keep 3-comp, and to abandon consciousness *is* the correct  
> materialist step, indeed. But you cannot keep 1-comp(*) then,  
> because it is defined
> by reference to consciousness. When you say "yes" to the doctor, we  
> assume the "yes" is related to the belief that you will survive.  
> This means you believe that you will not loose consciousness, not  
> become a zombie, nor will you loose (by assumption) your own  
> consciousness, by becoming someone else you can't identify with.
> >


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