Hi Stephen,

On 13 May 2009, at 22:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:

> Hi Bruno,
>
>     I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your  
> writtings and discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas  
> that I have expressed so far, such as those in this exchange, are  
> merely the misgivings and thoughts that I have based on my long  
> study of philosophy, I can claim no certification nor degree. I am  
> merely an amateur.


You are welcome.




>     I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a  
> property that is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that  
> is its contrary. I can not obtain free energy from any machine and I  
> can not obtain change from any static structure. While it is true  
> that one can agrue that the property of "saltiness" can not be found  
> in the properties of "Clorine" nor "Sodium", this does not  
> invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is  
> a similarity of kind  and mere difference in degree between  
> saltiness and chemical make up. Change and Staticness are  
> categorically different in kind.


You are right, you cannot obtain change from staticness. I don't think  
I am pretending that.



>
>
>     This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The  
> eliminatists, such as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense  
> of consciousness as a mere epiphenomena or "illusion" tells us  
> nothing about the unavoidability, modulo Salvia for example, of  
> qualia.

Eliminativism is dangerous. It is insulting. It is like saying "you  
are a zombie". Even Thorgny recognize that this is not too kind to  
tell to others.



>
>     By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson  
> Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the  
> focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain.  
> The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and  
> nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or  
> Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question:
>
>             Where does the appearence of change obtain from  
> primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence?


Because you can define in arithmetic, using only addition and  
multiplication symbols, and logic,  the notion of computation, or of  
pieces of computation, like you can define provability (by PA, by ZF,  
or by any effective theory) already in the very weak (yet Turing  
universal) Robinson Arithmetic.

You can entirely define in arithmetic statements of the kind "The  
machine x on input y has not yet stop after z steps". The notion of  
"time" used  here through the notion of computational steps can be  
deined entirely from the notion of natural numbers successor (which  
can be taken as primitive or defined through addition and  
multiplication).

If you prefer, I could tell you that in arithmetic we have a very  
notion of time: the natural number sequence. Then we can define in  
arithmetic the notion of computation, and the notion of next step for  
a computation made by such or such machine. And from that, we can  
explain how the subjective appearance of physical times and spaces  
occur.

UDA explains why we have to proceed that way, and AUDA explains how we  
can do, and actually, it has been done concretely. Of course the  
extraction of physics is technically demanding. I should test on new  
machine the quantum tautologies (and some people are trying recently  
to do so, we will see). Up to now quantum mechanics confirms the comp  
self-referential statistics.

You should keep in mind that, due to incompleteness, from the point of  
view of the machine, although Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dp, Bp &Dp & p, all  
define the same extensional provability notion (G* knows that), they  
differ intensionally for the machine, and, for the machine they obeys  
quite different logic. The incompleteness nuances forces the  
arithmetical reality to *appear* very differently "from inside". The  
Theatetical knower Bp & p, for example, gives a knowledge operator,  
and can be used to explain why machine can know many things, but also  
why they can not define knowledge, why the first person knower has  
really no name, etc. The logic of Bp & Dp & p gives a logic of qualia,  
or perceptive fields, etc.

Don't hesitate to ask question. Normally UDA is much simpler to  
understand than AUDA. I will reexplain the step seven to Kim, soon or  
later.


Bruno


Time is an illusion, but the illusion of time is not an illusion.
It is a theorem that all self-referentially correct machines are  
confronted with such an illusion, and they make precise discourses  
about them. UDA forbids to take such arithmetical machine as mere  
zombie, or you have to abandon the comp hypothesis.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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