Bruno Marchal skrev:
> Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
> consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
> be conscious *about*.
> It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes
> systematic doubting procedure (this fit well with the self-reference
> logics, taking consciousness as consistency).
> Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake
Yes, you are right. I can only fake doubts...
> We live on the overlap of a subjective un-sharable certainty (the
> basic first person knowledge) and an objective doubtful but sharable
> possible reality (the third person belief).
> To keep 3-comp, and to abandon consciousness *is* the correct
> materialist step, indeed. But you cannot keep 1-comp(*) then, because
> it is defined
> by reference to consciousness. When you say "yes" to the doctor, we
> assume the "yes" is related to the belief that you will survive. This
> means you believe that you will not loose consciousness, not become a
> zombie, nor will you loose (by assumption) your own consciousness, by
> becoming someone else you can't identify with.
I can say "yes" to the doctor, because it will not be any difference for
me, I will still be a zombie afterwards...
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at