Bruno Marchal skrev:
> Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its 
> consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can 
> be conscious *about*.
> It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes 
> systematic doubting procedure (this fit well with the self-reference 
> logics, taking consciousness as consistency).
> Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake 
> doubts)

Yes, you are right.  I can only fake doubts...

> We live on the overlap of a subjective un-sharable certainty (the 
> basic first person knowledge) and an objective doubtful but sharable 
> possible reality (the third person belief).
> To keep 3-comp, and to abandon consciousness *is* the correct 
> materialist step, indeed. But you cannot keep 1-comp(*) then, because 
> it is defined
> by reference to consciousness. When you say "yes" to the doctor, we 
> assume the "yes" is related to the belief that you will survive. This 
> means you believe that you will not loose consciousness, not become a 
> zombie, nor will you loose (by assumption) your own consciousness, by 
> becoming someone else you can't identify with.

I can say "yes" to the doctor, because it will not be any difference for 
me, I will still be a zombie afterwards...

Torgny Tholerus

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