On 28 Aug, 09:50, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> > > On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>:
> > >> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> > >> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
> > >> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
> > >> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
> > >> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
> > >> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
> > > Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
> > > real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
> > If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations
> > aren't real.
> That still doesn't follow. Water=H2O doesn't mean water is unreal.
> > Also that doesn't answer how it account for the
> > independance of implementation.
> A type of computation is an equivalence class of physical
> instances. They fall into the class by being susceptible
> to the same abstract definition, not by having the same extra phsyical
> This is no more mysterious than the fact that you can have quite a
> varied class of cubic things. Shape is multiply realisable too.
> > As the computation is not primary, how
> > 2 different physical process could generate the same computation
> > without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two
> > processes having existence.
> You do need abstract computations, but you don't
> need Platonic computations. Not all abstracta
> are Platonic. Check out the difference between Platonic and
> Ariostotelean forms.
> >How can you make sense of church-turing
> > thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ?
> Non-Platonic bstracta can make sense. Platonism supplies reference,
> not sense.
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