2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >>>>> >>>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>: >>>>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is >>>>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I >>>>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones >>>>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov). >>>>>> >>>>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the >>>>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ? >>>>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says >>>>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes. >>>> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations >>>> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the >>>> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how >>>> 2 different physical process could generate the same computation >>>> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two >>>> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing >>>> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Quentin >>> Try substituting "lengths" for "computations". Are lengths primary >>> because the same length can occur in different physical objects? >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> Why would I ? It's not the same thing at all... You could have said >> substitute by 'red'... there are multiple physical red object. >> >> The thing is you can come up with an infinity of physical (possible) >> realisation for a given computation. So the question is what is >> linking the computation to the physical realisation if not the >> abstract rules (which don't exists with physicalism, because there >> exists only "realized" computations... no abstract thing) ? > > Lengths are abstract to, but we don't take them to be fundamental. > Your reasoning is Platonism; you end up reifying every abstraction > simply because they are common to multiple realizations. > > Brent
I still disagree (about your wording game)... computation is not a property of a thing like a length is, it's a process. And yes I assume abstract rules simply exists... that's what allows me to build "concrete" realisation of such computation. Regards, Quentin > > >> >> Regards, >> Quentin >> >> >> >> > > > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---