2009/8/29 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >>>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >>>>>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>: >>>>>>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is >>>>>>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I >>>>>>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones >>>>>>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the >>>>>>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ? >>>>>>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says >>>>>>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes. >>>>>> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations >>>>>> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the >>>>>> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how >>>>>> 2 different physical process could generate the same computation >>>>>> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two >>>>>> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing >>>>>> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ? >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> Quentin >>>>> Try substituting "lengths" for "computations". Are lengths primary >>>>> because the same length can occur in different physical objects? >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>> Why would I ? It's not the same thing at all... You could have said >>>> substitute by 'red'... there are multiple physical red object. >>>> >>>> The thing is you can come up with an infinity of physical (possible) >>>> realisation for a given computation. So the question is what is >>>> linking the computation to the physical realisation if not the >>>> abstract rules (which don't exists with physicalism, because there >>>> exists only "realized" computations... no abstract thing) ? >>> Lengths are abstract to, but we don't take them to be fundamental. >>> Your reasoning is Platonism; you end up reifying every abstraction >>> simply because they are common to multiple realizations. >>> >>> Brent >> >> I still disagree (about your wording game)... computation is not a >> property of a thing like a length is, it's a process. > > So is walking. Shall we reify walking too? And then take it to be > fundamental? >
... Is it a joke or what I'm writing is non-sense ? >> >> And yes I assume abstract rules simply exists... > > I have no problem with taking rules to exist, but that's not the same > as assuming they are fundamental and can exist independently. > >>that's what allows me >> to build "concrete" realisation of such computation. > > I think they must exist in your brain first. > > Brent Well I think they exist independantly of my brain... My brain plays no roles at all in their existence. (Nor yours, nor any) Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---