2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >> If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold >> that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular >> computational types. > > They might do inexplocably. But the significant point > is that nothing else solves the HP either,
If you think they might do inexplicably, then presumably you don't hold that the merely functional association of conscious states with heterogeneous physical states counts as an adequate explanation. So what have we been disagreeing about? As to nothing else solving the HP, that has never been relevant to the discussion. David > > > > On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: >> 2009/9/23 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >> >> >> >> >> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't >> >> >> cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless >> >> >> the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't >> >> >> you say so? And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM? >> >> >> Would you respond to this please? >> >> > I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts >> > physcialism. >> >> If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold >> that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular >> computational types. > > They might do inexplocably. But the significant point > is that nothing else solves the HP either, > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
